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I. INTRODUCTION: WHY STUDY THE ADJUDICATION OF PATENT CASES? 
A patent is a powerful tool. It grants its owner exclusive rights over a 
particular technology by allowing him to exclude others from the use of 
that technology.1 It allows the inventor to exploit his unilateral control 
over the technology by charging other parties for the right to use the 
invention (i.e., a license). Or the inventor can retain sole access to the 
technology, charging supra-competitive prices for a good or service that 
no one else can produce without permission.2 Either way, the patentee 
retains sole control over his invention. 
From an institutional perspective, the patent system is a two-stage 
bargain.3 At the first stage, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) 
grants patent rights to inventors after conducting an examination of the 
prior art and of the patent application to determine whether the 
requirements for patentability are met.4 At the next stage, in order to 
enforce their issued patent rights, patentees have to resort to the federal 
courts with an action for patent infringement.5 Alleged infringers may 
counter by challenging the scope, validity, and enforceability of patent 
 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  
 2. See id. §§ 284, 289. 
 3. See Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 763, 772–73 (2002); Jay P. Kesan & Marc Banik, Patents as Incomplete Contracts: Aligning 
Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 23, 
30–33 (2000) (describing how the incomplete contract aspects of a patent can be interpreted as a two-
stage bargain). 
 4. The requirements for patentability are set forth in 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000). 
 5. See id. § 271. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/1
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rights issued in the first stage in the PTO.6 Thus, the patent system itself 
contemplates a role for the courts that involves reviewing the work of the 
PTO.  
The patent regime is typically justified by the economic argument that 
the benefits it creates outweigh the costs it imposes.7 The possibility of 
high profits and licensing fees accruing to patent holders guarantees that 
the creator of any valuable invention will be able to recoup his costs, 
thereby creating incentives to invest in research and new technologies.8 
However, these benefits of the patent system must not only outweigh the 
direct costs described above, but also the indirect “social costs” the system 
creates.9 For example, other inventors may face higher research and 
development costs as they take care to avoid the patented invention by 
“engineering around” it.10 Some technological areas may not be exploited 
or improved at all, as competitors avoid them for fear of running afoul of 
patented technologies to which they may not have legal access. 
For the social benefits of patents to exceed their total social costs, it is 
important that the fundamental bargain be retained that patents be granted 
only to inventions that are “new,” “useful,” and “non-obvious.”11 
Moreover, even when it is appropriate to grant a patent, it is essential that 
the patent rights not be overly broad, i.e., covering aspects of the 
technology that are beyond the invention’s “non-obvious” contribution12 
and thereby restricting access to technology that more properly lies in the 
public domain. Finally, a patent system that grants unwarranted or overly 
broad patents creates rewards for “getting some patent claims past the 
patent examiner” rather than promoting useful research.13 Thus, a patent 
 
 
 6. Kesan, supra note 3, at 773 (describing how patent rights can be revoked by the courts during 
litigation); HERBERT F. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 51–59 (3d ed. 2001) (describing the 
grounds and procedures for declaring all or part of a patent to be invalid in the context of an 
infringement case). 
 7. See Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative 
Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266 (1980); Pankaj Tandon, Innovation, Market Structure, and Welfare, 74 AM. 
ECON. REV. 394 (1984) (comparing the costs and benefits of patents). 
 8. See Jay P. Kesan, Intellectual Property Protection and Agricultural Biotechnology: A 
Multidisciplinary Perspective, 44 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 464, 488–90 (2000) (outlining the incentives 
created by the patent system).  
 9. See Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights 
for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999); see also 
Kesan, supra note 3 (describing the social costs of patents). 
 10. See Kesan & Banik, supra note 3, at 38–39 (discussing the costs created by engineering 
around a patent). 
 11. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103 (2000). 
 12. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 73–75 (giving the formal requirements for a technological 
change to be nonobvious and therefore worthy of a patent). 
 13. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why ”Bad” Patents Survive in the Market and How Should 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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regime that grants many “bad” patents is costly from a social welfare 
standpoint, imposing indirect and direct costs on numerous actors affected 
by the patent system.14  
For the reasons described above, it is important that a patent be granted 
only in the appropriate cases where the conditions for patentability are 
met. It is the job of the examiners at the PTO to insure that patent rights of 
appropriate scope are granted when warranted.15 However, there is 
growing concern that the number of overbroad or so-called “bad” patents 
may be increasing. The doubling of both the number of applications and 
the number of awarded patents between 1980 and 1996 has been 
accompanied by complaints about the level of resources devoted to 
examining applications and the training, incentives, and procedures facing 
patent examiners.16 Moreover, patent applications have become more 
complex since the 1970s,17 and patents are being granted in ever 
broadening areas of technology.18 Given the growing rate of patent 
applications and expanding areas of technology being patented, there is 
some concern that the number of overbroad or “bad” patents may be 
increasing. Consequently, there is a greater need for an efficient 
mechanism for revoking such overbroad patents.  
The U.S. currently has two avenues for challenging the validity of a 
patent: the PTO’s reexamination procedures and invalidation through the 
courts. At present, the PTO will reexamine patents via two mechanisms: 
reexamination and inter partes reexamination.19 The original 
 
 
We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 EMORY L.J. 61, 69 (2006). 
 14. See Bronwyn H. Hall et al., Prospects for Improving U.S. Patent Quality via Post-grant 
Opposition (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9731, 2003), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W9731.pdf (discussing how “low quality patents” impose costs by 
slowing the rate of invention while at the same time spurring patent applications and placing greater 
burdens on the PTO). 
 15. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 18–30 (describing the process for examination and 
prosecution of patents). 
 16. See Merges, supra note 9, at 601; see also John H. Barton, Reforming the Patent System, 287 
SCIENCE 1933, 1934 (2000) (“A PTO examiner can give each application an average of 25 to 30 hours 
and may in fact give much less. This is much less than the average time spent by a lawyer in preparing 
an application.” (citations omitted)). 
 17. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Patent 
System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002) (showing that patents now contain more claims, more cited 
references, and more inventors). 
 18. Kesan & Gallo, supra note 13, at 67 (discussing the new “patentable” areas and techniques 
which must be evaluated by patent examiners). 
 19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–05, 311–14 (2000); Stuart J. H. Graham et al., Post-issue Patent 
“Quality Control”: A Comparative Study of U.S. Patent Re-examinations and European Patent 
Oppositions (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/W8807.pdf (discussing the current U.S. reexamination procedure and 
comparing it with the patent opposition procedures employed by other countries); see also Hall et al., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/1
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reexamination procedure was initiated in 1980 as a low-cost method for 
reviewing patent validity.20 However, this procedure suffers from 
numerous limitations, and it is not widely used.21 Third parties can request 
a reexamination of a patent based on “new” prior art in the form of a 
patent or published work that was not considered in the original 
examination.22 They are not allowed to present other physical evidence or 
expert testimony to challenge the validity of the patent as they could in 
court.23 Even if the PTO determines that there is “a substantial new 
question of patentability,”24 the role that the third party can play in the 
patent reexamination process is extremely limited.25 In effect, the 
procedure is similar to that of the original examination and involves only 
the examiner and the patentee.26 If all or part of the patent is revoked, the 
patentee can appeal as he could after the original examination, while the 
third party has no forum for an appeal.27 And if the reexamination does not 
revoke any patent rights, any new prior art presented during the 
reexamination will be weakened as potentially invalidating evidence in 
any subsequent litigation, because the court is very likely to presume that 
the PTO has already adequately evaluated it and found it to be 
unpersuasive.28 
Thus, both the grounds for requesting a reexamination and the nature of 
the procedure make the system unattractive to interested third parties. As a 
consequence, the number of reexaminations requested has reached about 
20% of the number that was anticipated when the legislation was 
enacted—running at 200 to 400 cases a year.29 While less than 1% of U.S. 
issued patents face reexamination, approximately 8% of European patents 
 
 
supra note 14; Kesan & Gallo, supra note 13, at 114 (discussing the Japanese patent invalidation 
process); Merges, supra note 9; Allan M. Soobert, Breaking New Grounds in Administrative 
Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition—and Beyond, 14 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER 
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 63 (1998) (discussing the deficiencies of the U.S. reexamination systems and 
comparing them with both the European and Japanese approaches). For a critical analysis of the 
current U.S. reexamination procedures, see Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to 
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943 (2004). 
 20. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 965–66.  
 21. Id. 
 22. See 35 U.S.C. § 301 (2000); Merges, supra note 9, at 610. 
 23. Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 965–67. 
 24. Schwartz, supra note 6, at 51–52. 
 25. Soobert, supra note 19, at 101. 
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2000). Soobert, supra note 19, at 101–02. 
 27. Soobert, supra note 19, at 101–02.  
 28. Id. at 103. 
 29. Merges, supra note 9, at 610. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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face oppositions.30 It stands to reason that unless U.S. patent examiners are 
more accurate than their European counterparts by a factor of twenty, the 
U.S. reexamination system is not doing a good job of weeding out 
overbroad or unwarranted patents. 
To alleviate these problems, an alternative mechanism was created.31 
Under the inter partes reexamination procedure introduced in 1999, third 
parties are allowed a much greater role in the examination process.32 
However, they have very limited ability to appeal a ruling under this 
procedure, and these third parties are hampered by the PTO reexamination 
process in subsequent infringement litigation in the courts.33 As a 
consequence, it is not surprising that this system is utilized at an even 
lower rate than the original reexamination system; only twenty-six inter 
partes reexaminations were requested in the first five years after its 
enactment.34 
Therefore, given the limited opportunities for post-issuance patent 
challenges in the PTO,35 much of the burden of revoking overly broad 
patents will fall on the courts in the context of a patent infringement 
lawsuit (or declaratory judgment action).36 In response to the filing of such 
a case, the alleged infringer may mount a defense that some or all the 
asserted patent claims should not have been granted in the first place.37 If 
the court finds that the PTO erred in granting the patent, it can declare 
some or all the patent claims to be invalid.38 Thus the courts are an integral 
part of the patent system and serve as an institutional mechanism not only 
for protecting and enforcing valid patent rights, but also for maintaining 
the integrity of the process used to grant those rights. 
The patent litigation system, however, has its shortcomings as a 
mechanism for revoking invalid patents. The only grounds for launching a 
suit regarding a patent is a charge of infringement, and the validity of a 
patent can be challenged in a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit or 
 
 
 30. Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 966. 
 31. Id. at 967. 
 32. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311, 314 (2000); see also Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 967. 
 33. Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 964. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 967; Soobert, supra note 19, at 100–01 (describing 
how few patents are subjected to reexamination by the PTO). 
 36. For simplicity, we will refer to both types of cases as “patent infringement” suits. 
 37. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 51–52 (describing how the invalidity defense can be used in 
patent infringement case); id. at 42–44 (explaining the conditions under which a patent’s validity 
attacked in a declaratory judgment action). 
 38. Id. at 51–59 (describing the grounds and procedures for declaring all or part of a patent to be 
invalid in the context of an infringement case). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/1
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as part of a declaratory judgment action launched after the threat of such a 
suit. In the absence of a charge of infringement, a third party has no 
mechanism for challenging a patent in the courts. Even after a complaint 
has been filed, the courts require clear and convincing evidence in order to 
invalidate a patent.39 Under current law, patents are granted a 
“presumption of validity” and the challenger must provide “clear and 
convincing evidence” rather than a “preponderance of evidence” that the 
patent should be totally or partially invalidated.40 These limitations, 
however, can be dealt with through appropriate patent legislation.41  
There are other more fundamental problems with using the courts as a 
mechanism for revoking wrongly granted patent rights. There is general 
agreement that the costs associated with pursuing a patent lawsuit are 
high.42 Previous authors have cited legal costs of patent litigation running 
from $500,000 to $3 million per suit or $500,000 per claim at issue per 
side.43 These costs create incentives for the parties to settle their dispute 
rather than seek a final judgment on the merits.44 Throughout the case, the 
parties will be receiving additional information about the strength of their 
positions through the results of discovery, the court’s construction of the 
patent claims at issue, rulings on motions for summary judgment, rulings 
on preliminary injunctions, and the like. Economic theory suggests that 
when it becomes obvious that a patent is very likely to be invalidated, it is 
in the best interests of the patent holder to offer a cheap license to keep the 
patent rights intact, and it is in the best interests of the defendant to accept 
such an offer rather than incur further significant legal costs.45 
Specifically, it is in the interest of the alleged infringer to accept a license 
if its cost would be less than the cost of continued litigation.46 Only patent 
disputes where it is difficult to predict who will win are likely to proceed 
further to a final determination on the merits.47  
 
 
 39. Jennifer K. Bush et al., Six Patent Law Puzzlers, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 15–17 (2004). 
 40. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (presumption of validity); 35 U.S.C. § 273(b)(4) (2000) (burden of 
proof); see also Bush et al., supra note 39.  
 41. In fact, such a change is currently being debated. See Bush et al., supra note 39, at 16. 
 42. See Hall, supra note 14, at 8; Barton, supra note 16, at 1933. 
 43. Hall, supra note 14, at 8. 
 44. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and 
the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991). 
 45. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For, Get What We Paid For, and Not Liking 
What We Got: The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943 (2004) (discussing how 
changes in civil procedure promoting fact-finding during discovery have created an environment in 
which parties are more likely to settle as their expectations of trial outcomes converge and they 
evaluate whether to undertake additional pre-trial expenditures or seek a settlement).  
 46. See Yeazell, supra note 45.  
 47. This is an extension of the general theory of litigation set forward by Priest & Klein who 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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However, society may have an economic interest in seeing these 
disputes decided through a formal judgment, which neither the court nor 
the parties take into account.48 The parties may settle when both decide 
that the benefits to doing so exceed their private costs of continuing 
litigation. In short, as other authors have pointed out, pursuit of patent 
invalidation suffers from a “free rider” problem.49 One firm may incur the 
court costs, but firms incurring no costs will benefit from an invalidation 
ruling, too. Therefore, everyone has an incentive to allow someone else to 
take on the burden. Even if the technology blocked by a “bad” patent is 
very useful or valuable, no one firm or even a small group of firms may 
pursue its invalidation. Stated alternatively, it is not just how valuable a 
patent is that is important, but to whom that value accrues that matters.50 
The courts do little to counter these incentives. Instead, courts promote 
settlement to save the public the expense of a trial or lengthy litigation.51 
Trials are expensive, and courts have limited resources, so in civil cases it 
is generally considerably more efficient to promote a resolution of the 
dispute without the expense of a lengthy trial or the expense of continuing 
the proceedings until some form of judgment is rendered.52 In fact, it is 
considered a hallmark of efficient court management to encourage parties 
to resolve their disputes outside the courtroom because litigation costs are 
 
 
argue that if a case has a clear-cut winner and loser, the parties are likely to settle. George L. Priest & 
Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).  The authors 
explain that only cases with a high degree of uncertainty, that is, cases in which the parties assess the 
odds of winning differently or where the odds are close to 50% for each, will actually go to trial. Id.; 
see also John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–07 (1998) (finding that the rate of invalidation cannot be shown to be 
statistically different from 50%).  
 48. See Merges, supra note 9; see also Kesan, supra note 3 (describing the costs to society when 
bad patents are allowed to stay in force).  
 49. See Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 948–60 (discussing how firms which do not 
contribute to litigation costs will benefit from the ruling, so everyone has an incentive to let someone 
else incur the expense). We believe there is also a “public good” to be obtained from formal rulings of 
infringement, because they provide information to uninvolved third parties that may help them avoid 
some unnecessary expenses of engineering around a patent. Obviously, the parties benefiting from 
such information will not contribute to the cost of obtaining it in court. 
 50. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (arguing that patents 
which are litigated are likely to be the most valuable). We do not dispute the argument that the patents 
which are litigated are likely to be valuable patents. We contend that the distribution of value matters 
as well; if it is distributed among many parties, the case will probably not be litigated through to a 
judgment on the merits. The issue is not that the wrong patents are litigated, but that too few may be 
reviewed in court. 
 51. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 44, at 320 (“[L]awyers, judges, and commentators agree 
that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil 
procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial.”). 
 52. See id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/1
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also a loss to society.53 But neither the court nor the parties include the 
social benefits of revoking a “bad” patent in making their private decisions 
about the appropriate use of their resources.54 In a similar fashion, third-
party firms simply conclude that it is cheaper to pay for a license or 
engineer around an erroneously granted patent than to challenge it. They 
will not take into account the benefit of appropriately defining the scope of 
patent protection to other firms or to society as a whole when making their 
decisions. Consequently, the validity of too few patents will be reviewed 
on the merits by the courts.  
Thus, any analysis of reform to the patent system requires a better 
understanding of the effectiveness and cost of adjudicating the validity, 
infringement, and enforceability of issued patents. It is important to know 
exactly how patent cases are resolved—do they settle or do they proceed 
to some form of adjudication on the merits? It is important to understand 
the costs of such cases and the magnitude of the incentives to settle. And it 
is crucial to know how these factors relate to the courts’ ability to correct 
or tailor the scope of patent rights. It should be noted that we are not alone 
in worrying that the use of non-judicial forms of dispute resolution may 
have unanticipated consequences. There is a growing literature on the 
potential social costs of the “vanishing trial.”55 And while we care less 
about trials per se, we are in agreement that the movement away from 
public forms of dispute resolution may be a cause for concern. 
Most previous work on patent litigation, in fact, has concentrated on 
the small proportion of cases that go to trial.56 Even studies that attempt to 
analyze all forms of adjudication employ government statistics which, 
while an excellent starting point, do not have the required degree of 
precision needed to identify which cases settle and which are adjudicated 
 
 
 53. See Yeazell, supra note 45, at 947–48 (“Trials, especially in the common-law tradition, are in 
many respects ‘wasteful’: they produce a victor, but at great cost to both sides and to the public. . . . 
‘[A] trial is a failure.’”) (quoting Gross & Syverud, supra note 44, at 320).  
 54. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 44, at 320 (discussing the cost-saving motivations behind 
the effort to avoid trials); see also Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the 
Vanishing Trial Phenomenon, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 977–78 (2004) (discussing possible 
losses to the public from the small number of trials). 
 55. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 44; Landsman, supra note 54, at 977 (“The evidence trials 
generate may be of value not only to litigants and the courts but to the public at large.  The risks posed 
by asbestos, cigarettes, and a host of other items would not have been broadcast without the sharing of 
information obtained in litigation and disseminated at trial.”); Yeazell, supra note 45; John Lande, 
Replace “The Vanishing Trial” with More Helpful Myths, 23 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 
161 (2005); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the 
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (2005). 
 56. See infra Part II.C. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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on the merits.57 In this work, we start from the available government data 
sources but supplement them by studying the actual court docket reports 
for all patent cases filed in three recent years: 1995, 1997, and 2000.58 We 
then follow each patent case until it is terminated. From the reports, we are 
able to precisely determine how each case was resolved.59 We also expand 
the set of proxies for litigation costs by including a new measure available 
in the court docket reports—the number of documents filed in the case—
which we believe should be highly correlated with the actual number of 
attorney “billable hours” expended on the case.60 We then determine how 
many actual rulings on the merits are made concerning infringement and 
invalidity, how those cases are resolved, and what their estimated 
litigation costs are.61  
Using this methodology and by tracking these cohorts of cases, we are 
now able to provide a more complete picture of patent adjudication. As we 
will show, more final rulings on the merits are rendered prior to trial in 
patent cases than has been suggested in the previous literature.62 
Successful final rulings of summary judgment are in fact more important 
than bench or jury trials in resolving patent cases.63 Nonetheless, the vast 
majority of cases settle and all rulings, including grants of summary 
judgment, appear to be expensive.64 In addition, we find that there are very 
few rulings of invalidity by the courts.65 While cases in which there is a 
final ruling on infringement are equally likely to terminate either at the 
pre-trial stage or through a trial, a much higher proportion of final rulings 
of invalidity occur at the pre-trial stage.66 Despite the “early” stage at 
which invalidity rulings are rendered, they are among the most expensive 
patent cases.67  
This Article is organized as follows. Part II reviews the previous 
literature on patent litigation. Part III describes our methodology for 
collecting data on patent cases and classifying them according to the 
precise manner in which they were resolved. We then analyze the results 
and insights that we gain from a study of these case outcomes. Part IV 
 
 
 57. See infra Part II.A. 
 58. See infra Part III. 
 59. See infra Part III.A. 
 60. See infra Part IV. 
 61. See infra Parts III.D, IV. 
 62. See infra Part III.C. 
 63. See infra Part III.C. 
 64. See infra Parts III.C, IV.B–C. 
 65. See infra Part III.D. 
 66. See infra Part III.D. 
 67. See infra Part IV.D. 
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presents our analysis of the costs of patent litigation, across all cases, for 
cases adjudicated through final judgments, and for cases with formal 
rulings of infringement or invalidity. In Part V, we present our 
conclusions. 
We believe the empirical results from this work can serve as a 
foundation for any serious patent reform proposal.68 For instance, the 
expense of rulings, particularly rulings of invalidity, suggests that use of 
the courts creates the wrong incentives—the incentive to settle cases, 
rather than the incentive to see that questionable patents are reviewed and 
then retained or revoked. The lack of rulings and the small number of 
issued patents that are revoked suggest that these incentives are inhibiting 
the ability of the courts to fulfill their role in the patent system. It would 
seem that some other new procedures, such as post-grant oppositions, are 
necessary to replace or supplement the courts as the primary institution for 
reviewing questionable patents. 
II. PREVIOUS STUDIES OF PATENT LITIGATION 
Research on patent litigation is one of many topics growing out of the 
general study of civil litigation. The classical theoretical models of 
litigation focus on how defendants and plaintiffs bargain to settle a filed 
dispute or go to trial.69 Under perfect information—that is, when both 
parties know with certainty who would win at trial—no trials would occur. 
 
 
 68. As of this writing, legislation reforming the U.S. patent system is being considered by 
Congress. See Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); see also Graham et al., 
supra note 19; Hall, supra note 14; Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable 
Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1997); Kesan & 
Gallo, supra note 13; F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of 
Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Merges, supra note 9; Joseph Scott 
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defending Patents, 19 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 667 (2004); Arti K. Rai, Allocating Power over Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907 (2004); Soobert, supra note 19.  
 69. The literature on this topic is enormous; the important theoretical works on this topic include: 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. ECON. 404 
(1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 RAND J. ECON. 198 (1987); Ivan Png, 
Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Priest & Klein, supra 
note 47; Jennifer Reinganum & Louis Wilder, Settlement, Litigation and the Allocation of Litigation 
Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON., 557 (1986); Steven Shavell, Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory is Possible, 
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (1996); Kathryn E. Spier, The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation, 59 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 93 (1992). An excellent summary of the early literature can be found in Robert D. Cooter 
& Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 37 J. ECON. 
LITERATURE, 1067 (1989). More recent work, particularly that involving multiple parties, is 
summarized in Andrew F. Daugherty & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Economic Theories of Settlement 
Bargaining (Dep’t of Econ. Vanderbilt U., Working Paper No. 05-W08, 2005), available at 
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/wparchive/workpaper/vu05-w08.pdf. 
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There is no reason for the parties to expend resources to achieve an 
outcome which is determined with certainty in advance. For trials to occur, 
either the parties must be behaving irrationally, or there must be some 
uncertainty about the probability of a victory in the courtroom. In the 
“divergent expectations” models, uncertainty arises because both parties 
are simply unsure about the prospect of victory.70 In asymmetric 
information models, one party has more information than the other, and 
his settlement offers are intended to serve as a signal of his bargaining 
strength or as a mechanism for determining the strength of his opponent.71 
Thus, models of settlement describe how the parties bargain to determine 
shares of the surplus that would result from avoiding the costs of a trial 
under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information.72 These 
bargaining models have been used to explore how differences in stakes, 
the cost of litigation, and legal rules influence the choice between settling 
the dispute or going to trial.73 Recent theoretical work also takes a more 
sophisticated view of what happens within the case by modeling both the 
costs and the revelation of information that occur during the discovery 
phase preceding trial.74  
Another theory explaining the existence of trials is “asymmetric 
stakes”: if the defendant’s loss does not equal the plaintiff’s gain, there 
may be no surplus from the avoidance of a trial to divide and no point in 
bargaining to a settlement.75 Usually, the asymmetric stakes are produced 
by costs and benefits created outside the courtroom, such as the reputation 
effects or precedents created for other litigation.76  
 
 
 70. For example, each party’s estimate of winning may be drawn from a normal distribution 
about their true probability of winning, with most estimates close to the true value but occasionally 
wildly optimistic or pessimistic. Priest & Klein, supra note 47, showed that parties are most likely to 
be mistaken, and trials are therefore most likely to occur, in cases where each side’s actual prospect of 
winning is 50%. Thus, we would expect to observe an equal number of victories for each side in trials 
when they do occur—this is the well known “50% rule.” Id.; see Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling 
Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451 
(1998) (describing the “50% rule”). 
 71. Priest & Klein, supra note 47, at 1. 
 72. See Waldfogel, supra note 70 (discussing the implications of the two models).  
 73. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 69 (summarizing the implications of different modeling 
specifications). 
 74. For two examples, see Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, An Economic Model of 
Legal Discovery, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 435 (1994) and Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Civil Litigation 
with Mandatory Discovery and Voluntary Transmission of Private Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 
137 (2005). 
 75. See, e.g., Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward A Taxonomy of Disputes: New 
Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 109–11 (1999). 
 76. Id. at 109. 
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There is an immense and growing empirical literature testing the 
implications of these models, both in civil litigation in general and within 
specific topical areas.77 Some of these studies examine all civil cases, but 
it is also common to focus on one area of litigation. 
A. Empirical Work on Patent Litigation 
Patent infringement litigation is one of the few topical areas where 
researchers have used empirical studies to test the implications of the 
various theoretical models of litigation.78 Researchers have been able to 
explore important questions not only about the general level of patent 
litigation, but also regarding important aspects of patent cases related to 
the general theory of civil litigation.79 Who files a patent suit? How do 
parties and the courts behave once a suit is filed? These questions are 
crucial for analyzing what happens in patent litigation and how well the 
 
 
 77. See, e.g., Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the Civil Justice 
System (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10825, 2004), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w10825.pdf.  
 78. Most of the work specifically on patent litigation has been empirical rather than theoretical. 
But cf. Jean O. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights: A Survey of 
the Empirical Literature 2–7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6296, 1997), 
available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w6296.pdf (outlining a stylized theoretical model of the 
choice to file and strategic behavior within a patent lawsuit and predicting that the propensity to go to 
trial will be increasing in uncertainty about trial outcomes, the asymmetry of expectations about trial 
outcomes, and the cost of going to trial; Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of Patent Litigation, 20 
RAND J. ECON. 77 (1989) (demonstrating that trials may occur in patent cases—even under full 
information—if the post-settlement duopoly price is sufficiently less than the monopoly price that 
would have been generated by a judgment, thereby wiping out the benefits of a settlement; and 
exploring conditions under asymmetric information in which the holder of a weak patent may “bluff” 
through his settlement offer). See also Farrell & Merges, supra note 19, at 955–60 (developing a 
simple model of how external benefits to uninvolved firms and consumers may lead to too little 
investment in patent litigation and too few patents being found invalid).  
 79. See Allison et al., supra note 50; James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent 
Policy from Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 24 (2005); 
Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 78; Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of Patent 
Litigation: A Window on Competition, 12 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001) [hereinafter Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, Patent Litigation]; Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Protecting Intellectual 
Property Rights: Are Small Firms Handicapped?, 47 J.L. & ECON. 45 (2004) [hereinafter Lanjouw & 
Schankerman, Small Firms]; Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does 
Geographical Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Forum 
Shopping]; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek Inside the 
Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000) [hereinafter Moore, Judges, Juries]; Deepak Somaya, 
Strategic Determinants of Decisions Not to Settle Patent Litigation, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 17 (2003) 
[hereinafter Somaya, Strategic Determinants]; Deepak Somaya, Firm Strategies and Litigation Tactics 
as Determinants of Patent Suit Duration in Computers and Research Medicines (2002), available at 
http://bmgt3-notes.umd.edu/Faculty/KM/papers.nsf/6de61a84f4107c9d852567f2006c7c0e/d12fe6c7b1
9cf47f85256ba6005f2a4f?OpenDocument [hereinafter Somaya, Duration]. 
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courts fulfill their role of protecting patent rights while eliminating bad 
patents. 
Empirical research on patent litigation makes use of three basic sources 
of data, each demonstrating a different aspect of patent litigation and each 
with particular strengths and weaknesses: written opinions in patent cases 
available through U.S. Patents Quarterly80 (which gives information on all 
written opinions but, naturally, cannot provide information about cases 
resolved through other mechanisms or about the patents at issue in such 
cases); patent cases reported to the U.S. Patent Office (PTO data) and 
available through Derwant LitAlert81 (which gives detailed information 
about the patents involved in every case reported, but does not include all 
cases because there is incomplete reporting to the PTO82); and the record 
of patent cases extracted from the data on all litigation produced by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO)83 (from which all patent 
cases can be extracted84 but which does not give information about the 
patents at issue). These sources are supplemented by data on parties or 
patent holders available through Compustat and the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), a patent database prepared by Hall et al.85 
More recent studies are also supplementing these sources by consulting 
the information on cases accessible through the online docket reports 
available at the PACER websites.86  
Several researchers have identified what seems to be an increase in the 
rate of patent litigation, some even talking of a litigation “explosion.”87 
For most of the past twenty years, the number of patent suits grew at a 
rapid rate that largely paralleled the growth in the total number of patents. 
 
 
 80. U.S.P.Q. (BNA) (various issues). 
 81. Derwant LitAlert, http://www.westlaw.com. 
 82. Somaya reports that the PTO data contains about 50–58% of all patent cases terminating 
between 1983 and 1993. Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79, at 22.  
 83. Compiled by the Federal Judicial Center. See Federal Judicial Center, Federal Court Cases 
Integrated Database, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu (last visited Aug. 20, 2005) (Access to this data 
compiled by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Science and Social Research (ICPSR) 
requires registration and log-in.). 
 84. See Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79, at 22 (finding that only 5% of all cases 
listing PTO data were not included among cases classified as patent cases in the AO data and that 
therefore the AO data is relatively complete).  
 85. Bronwyn H. Hall et al., The NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights, and 
Methodological Tools (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001), available at 
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8498.pdf.  
 86. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts. 
gov/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2005). 
 87. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 79, at 24 (quoting James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The 
Patent Litigation Explosion, 12 (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)). 
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Prakash-Canjels88 analyzes the trend in patent cases using reported data 
provided by the AO and shows that the total number of patent cases filed 
each year increased by 111% between 1990 and 2000.89 Lanjouw and 
Schankerman90 estimate the probability of a patent being involved in 
litigation and find no change in this probality over the period from 1978 to 
1995.91 However, Somaya,92 using the same data as Prakash-Canjels, also 
examines the rate of patent litigation between 1970 and 2000. His data 
shows that the number of patent cases filed per year was stagnant until the 
mid-1980s and has been growing at an increasing rate since that time.93 
Bessen and Meurer94 also find that patent litigation may have accelerated 
in the late 1990s and exceeded the growth in existent patents during that 
period.95 Thus, it appears that the role of the courts in the patent system 
has grown in recent years, especially over the past ten years. 
B. Studies of the Characteristics of Patents Involved in Litigation 
Empirical research on patent litigation has an advantage over the study 
of other areas of civil litigation; it is possible to identify all patents and, 
therefore, to identify the entire population of potential litigants—or at least 
potential plaintiffs. Researchers on patent litigation have exploited this 
advantage to produce a body of literature exploring what characteristics 
lead a patent or patentee to be involved in litigation.96  
One of the earliest studies of the probability of a patent being involved 
in litigation was done by Lerner.97 Based on a sample of 530 
biotechnology firms, he calculates the number of Massachusetts patent 
suits in which the sampled firms were involved during January 1990 to 
June 1994 and compares that number with the number of patents they 
 
 
 88. Gauri Prakash-Canjels, Trends in Patent Cases: 1990–2000, 41 IDEA 283 (2001). 
 89. Id. at 284–85 (showing that 1178 patent cases were filed in 1991 and 2484 were filed in 
2000). 
 90. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79.  
 91. Id. at 55–56.  
 92. Deepak Somaya, Patent Litigation in the United States (1970–2000) (Mar. 30, 2002), 
available at http://bmgt1-notes.umd.edu/Faculty/KM/papers.nsf/225f2e46a850b27885256a560076 
708a/d12fe6c7b19cf47f85256ba6005f2a4f/$FILE/Somaya2002c.pdf [hereinafter Samaya, Patent 
Litigation]. 
 93. Id. at 4–5.  
 94. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 79. 
 95. Bessen & Meurer, supra note 79, at 24. 
 96. This question is, of course, closely related to the total volume of patent litigation, since it can 
be used to predict the number of cases expected in the future. 
 97. Josh O. Lerner, The Importance of Trade Secrecy: Evidence from Civil Litigation, available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6089 (last visited Aug. 21, 2005); Lanjouw & 
Lerner, supra note 78, at 8. 
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were awarded during that period.98 This allows him to estimate that six 
cases per hundred patents held by those firms will be litigated.99 It should 
be noted that this litigation rate is higher than that observed across all 
patents.100 This result would support the conclusion that patents in new 
technologies, such as biotechnology, are more likely to be litigated than 
those in mature fields because there is more uncertainty about case 
outcomes. 
Other work relies on a more global population of potential litigants. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman estimate the probability of a patent being 
involved in litigation across a number of technological fields.101 They use 
litigated patents reported to the PTO between 1975 and 1991, and after 
adjusting for underreporting, estimate that on average 10.7 patents per 
thousand will be litigated.102 They also construct a “control group” 
composed of patents filed at the same time and having the same general 
characteristics (technological class, number of claims, etc.) and then 
perform probit (discrete choice) analysis of the impact of patent 
characteristics on the probability of litigation.103  
Lanjouw and Schankerman also explore how the probability of a patent 
being involved in litigation is related to various factors. They find support 
for the view that the probability of litigation increases as the stakes of the 
case increase. Litigation probability increases with the number of claims 
describing the patent’s invention104 and with the number of later patents 
that cite it as part of the prior art or as defining the state of the art.105 
Importantly, both factors are indicators of patent high value.106  
The probability of litigation not only increases with the stakes of the 
case, but also with the “asymmetry” of those stakes, i.e., the degree to 
which they affect one party more than the other.107 The chance that a 
patent will be involved in a suit increases with the degree to which the 
later patents citing it are technologically similar.108 If the patent is in a 
 
 
 98. Lerner, supra note 97. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Compare with Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Litigation, supra note 79, at 134 (estimating 
an overall litigation rate of 10.7 patents per thousand).  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. at 134. 
 103. Id. at 133. 
 104. Id. at 138. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.; see also Siegelman & Waldfogel, supra note 75, at 109–11 (describing the asymmetric 
stakes hypothesis). 
 108. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Litigation, supra note 79, at 138. 
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“crowded” field, disputes are more likely and reputation building by the 
patent holder is important to both deter future infringement and aid in 
future negotiations.109 Another form of asymmetric stakes can be seen in 
self citations; patents that are cited by other patents owned by the same 
party are more likely to be litigated because they form the first link in a 
research chain and, therefore, have value to that party beyond what is at 
issue in the case.110 
However, Lanjouw and Schankerman also find that while the 
probability of a patent appearing in litigation increases with the number of 
later patents citing it, it decreases with the number of backward citations, 
i.e., the number of previous patents cited by the patent at issue.111 In other 
words, a patent is less likely to be involved in a suit as its backward 
citations increase. The authors interpret this result as demonstrating that in 
new technological areas, where there is little previous work and few 
previous patents, there is a high level of uncertainty about the boundaries 
of patents and the way the courts will interpret them.112 Hence, it is 
difficult to come to agreement and parties are more likely to go to court. In 
general, they find support for the theoretical arguments that parties are 
more likely to engage in litigation when the outcome is uncertain and/or 
the stakes are high and asymmetric.113 
Lanjouw and Schankerman use the same data in a later paper to explore 
whether large firms may have a strategic advantage over small firms in 
patent litigation because they have a large portfolio of patents whose 
licenses can be used as bargaining tools.114 They find that having a large 
portfolio of patents reduces the probability of being involved in a dispute 
on any patent in the portfolio, although the portfolio effect is larger for 
smaller companies.115 They also find that patents in concentrated 
industries (i.e., those where the majority of patents are held by a few 
firms) are less likely to be involved in litigation.116 This also suggests that 
firms are engaging in cooperative play and cross-licensing, rather than 
litigation, to protect property rights.117  
 
 
 109. Id. at 132. 
 110. Id. at 138. 
 111. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Litigation, supra note 79, at 144. 
 112. Id. at 145. 
 113. Id. at 132. 
 114. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79.  
 115. Id. at 46. 
 116. Id. at 48. 
 117. Id. at 46–47. 
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A recent study of the probability of a patent being involved in litigation 
was performed by Allison, Lemley, Moore and Trunkey.118 These authors 
use the data on patent cases terminated from 1999 to 2000119 combined 
with the NBER database of patents filed between 1963 and 1999.120 They 
also compare a random sample of three hundred patents involved in 
litigation during this period with a sample of one thousand patents issued 
between mid-1996 and mid-1998.121 They find that patents are more likely 
to be involved in litigation if they are young, if they are issued to 
individuals or small, domestic corporations, if they spent more time in 
prosecution, and if they have a larger number of claims and citations to 
prior art.122 The authors also find that the probability of a patent being 
involved in litigation varies substantially across industries.123  
C. Studies of the “Costs” and Outcomes of Patent Cases 
The question of who is involved in patent litigation and how they 
behave once a case is filed are closely related. Obviously, an out-of-court 
negotiation of a licensing agreement is similar to a negotiation of a 
settlement agreement once the case has been filed. Thus, many of the same 
theories are tested and many of the same variables are employed. 
Lanjouw and Schankerman attempt to extend their analysis of filings of 
patent infringement cases to the outcomes of those cases, studying which 
cases are terminated through a trial.124 They find that trials are quite rare—
only 5% of all cases are terminated through a trial.125 They also explore 
whether the same strategic factors that were important in whether a case 
would be filed—size of stakes, asymmetry of stakes, and uncertainty126—
 
 
 118. Allison et al., supra note 50 (determining the characteristics of litigated patents). The authors 
further argue that patents involved in litigation are a subset of “valuable patents” because it would not 
be worth the expenditure on litigation if they were not valuable. Id. While this seems a reasonable 
claim, we will not focus on it here. 
 119. Allison et al., supra note 50; see also Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in American Courts, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1497, 1506–09 (2003) (describing the patent case data used in this study). 
 120. Allison et al., supra note 50; see also Hall, supra note 85. 
 121. Allison et al., supra note 50. The data was compiled by Allison & Lemley. See Allison & 
Lemley, supra note 17. 
 122. Allison et al., supra note 50, at 438. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 67–68.  
 125. Id. In fact, they interpret the 5% of cases that go to trial as indicating that “post-filing 
settlement rates are high (about 95%)”—a figure that is widely quoted. Id. See also Jean O. Lanjouw 
& Mark Schankerman, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8656, 2001), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8656.pdf (explaining in 
more detail the formulation of their data and analysis). 
 126. See supra Part II.B. 
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can also explain whether a case that has been filed goes to trial.127 
However, none of the variables on the nature of the patent or the parties128 
are significant in explaining which cases are adjudicated through a trial 
and which settle.129 They conclude that the strategic factors they examine 
exercise their effect on the decision to file and have little or no impact on 
the case after filing.130 While this conclusion may be true, it is also 
possible that their focus on trials, rather than all adjudication on the merits, 
may have an impact on their conclusions.  
Other studies focus on the types of rulings arrived at through a trial, 
evaluating the performance of the courts in deciding patent cases through 
the type of decision delivered at trials. In a series of studies,131 Moore uses 
the AO data from the 1980s and 1990s, supplemented by information from 
the docket reports, to analyze patent litigation cases in which final 
judgment was determined through a trial.132 She finds that while the 
overall decision rate is in favor of the patentee in 58% of the cases, there is 
a significant difference between the results when the decision is made by a 
jury than when it is by a judge: the decision is in favor of the patentee in 
68% of jury trials but in only 51% of bench trials.133 Likewise, she finds 
that juries are more likely to rule that the patent is valid (by a margin of 
71% to 64%) and that it was infringed (by a margin of 71% to 59%).134 
These results are reflected in the statistics she reports for requests for jury 
trials. Jury trials are requested in 78% of all patent cases,135 but 74% of 
patent holders request a jury while only 43% of alleged infringers do so.136 
These results support the view that the two sides are aware of these kinds 
of results.137 In other work, Moore examines the geographical distribution 
of patent cases to see whether the parties are engaging in “forum 
shopping” in pursuit of the most favorable venue.138 While she finds that 
 
 
 127. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 67–68. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 69. 
 131. Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 79; Moore, Judges, Juries, supra note 79. Kimberly A. 
Moore, Jury Demands: Who’s Asking, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847 (2002). 
 132. Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 79; Moore, Judges, Juries, supra note 79. 
 133. Moore, Judges, Juries, supra note 79, at 386 (noting the deviation in jury trials from the 
“50% rule” in jury trials). 
 134. Id. at 390.  
 135. See Moore, supra note 131, at 855. 
 136. See id. at 859.  
 137. Id. at 859. 
 138. Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 79. 
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patent litigation is concentrated in a few districts, she does not extract the 
factors that might be influencing such behavior from the data at hand.139 
While the previously described research focuses on trials, other work 
uses different sources to describe some aspects of adjudication both at trial 
and in the pre-trial stage. Allison and Lemley140 focus solely on rulings of 
invalidity in patent cases, using written rulings reported in U.S. Patents 
Quarterly.141 They find that they cannot reject the hypothesis that half of 
these rulings find the patent wholly or partially invalid.142 
Finally, some recent work analyzes the propensity to settle a case or 
pursue a judgment either through pre-trial adjudication or a ruling 
rendered at trial. Somaya, using AO data from 1983 to 1993 supplemented 
by PTO data,143 investigates whether the asymmetric stakes argument can 
be used to explain the decision to settle patent litigation.144 He formulates 
two classes of hypotheses. The first concerns settlements that can be 
explained by the asymmetric or “strategic” stakes of the parties in the 
patent at issue. Some patents will have great value to the patentee because 
they have yet to exploit the research (measured by the young of the 
patent). In other cases, the patent at issue may be in a technical area that 
the defendant values more highly than the plaintiff (measured by the 
number of times the alleged infringer’s patents cite the patent at issue).145 
The second class of hypotheses concerns the possibility of mutual 
holdup—one of the parties can use their other points of interaction 
(measured by how frequently the patentee cites other patents held by the 
alleged infringer) as punishment for not settling the suit.146  
Somaya examines whether the cases were resolved through a 
judgment147 and whether they progressed at least through the summary 
judgment phase before settling148 and finds some evidence to support the 
 
 
 139. See id. at 914.  
 140. Allison & Lemley, supra note 47, at 205–07. 
 141. Allison & Lemley, supra note 47; see also USPQ (BNA), supra note 80. 
 142. Allison & Lemley, supra note 47, at 205–07. It should be noted that this does not mean, as 
commonly cited, that half of all patents in litigation are found invalid. That result may be true, but 
more information on the frequency of counterclaims and defenses of invalidity would be necessary to 
draw it. 
 143. Somaya, Duration, supra note 79 (exploring the source of the data). 
 144. Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79, at 19–20 (explaining the asymmetric 
information and strategic stakes hypotheses). 
 145. Id.  
 146. See id. at 20–21. 
 147. Id. It is not clear from the text how the full sample of adjudicated cases is constructed, 
although it is obvious that Somaya is not restricting himself to decisions arrived at through a trial. 
 148. Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79, at 27. 
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strategic stakes hypotheses149 but little to support mutual holdup.150 In a 
related work,151 he examines the duration of cases and finds evidence that 
strategic behavior may influence not only whether there is a settlement but 
also how long it takes to reach one. In particular, he finds evidence that 
parties take into account the reputations created during litigation; the time 
to a settlement increases with the number of times the same patent has 
been involved in litigation.152  
Thus, we have learned much about the nature of patent litigation from 
the empirical work in this area. We know that an increasing proportion of 
patents seems to be involved in litigation. We know that the newer the 
technology, the greater the probability that a patent will be involved in a 
case.153 We know that the greater the overall value of a patent (when 
measured by citations or the patent’s age) the greater the probability of it 
being litigated.154 And finally, we know that firms seem to act strategically 
in patent litigation: they are less likely to settle if they have a number of 
patents in the same area, or if the patent is involved in multiple suits and 
they want to establish an aggressive reputation.155  
However, what is still not clear is just how many patent cases are 
adjudicated on the merits to a final outcome. Most of the work on 
analyzing behavior conditional on a case being filed focuses on what 
happens at trial.156 Some work has been done incorporating pre-trial 
adjudication, but the data used has deficiencies which may misclassify 
many adjudicated cases,157 and the period covered does not reflect current 
patent law and procedure. Moreover, to date, attempts to measure the cost 
 
 
 149. Id. at 33–34 (admitting that some asymmetric information arguments could explain the same 
results). 
 150. Id. at 34–35. 
 151. Somaya, Duration, supra note 79. 
 152. Id. at 28–29. 
 153. See Lerner, supra note 97. 
 154. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79; see also Allison et al., supra note 
50. 
 155. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, Patent Litigation, supra note 79; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 
Small Firms, supra note 79, Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 79; Moore, Judges, Juries, supra 
note 79. 
 156. For an exception, see Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79 (making use of whether 
cases settle in the pre-summary judgment phase or proceed to motions on summary judgment as well 
as whether cases settle). 
 157. Somaya seems to be relying on the AO’s designation of certain cases being decided after 
completing the “judgment on motion” stage in selecting which cases survive without settling until 
summary judgment motions are complete. See id. at 27. As we will show, relying on the AO categories 
misses many final rulings and therefore cannot be used to determine the total volume of cases closed 
through judgments. See infra Part III.B. 
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of patent litigation can only use the duration of the case as a proxy,158 and 
one which is notoriously inaccurate due to the idiosyncrasies of court 
schedules and the like. It is our hope that this work will begin to fill in 
some of these gaps. 
III. CLASSIFYING CASE OUTCOMES: HOW MANY CASES ARE 
ADJUDICATED ON THE MERITS? 
The principal goal of this study is to answer the questions: How many 
cases are adjudicated on the merits? How common are rulings of 
infringement or invalidity? And what can we say about the costs of such 
rulings? Given the inadequacies of the major litigation databases for 
answering these questions,159 we have chosen to take a different approach. 
We examined the docket report for every patent case filed in 1995, 1997, 
and 2000, classified them according to the manner in which they were 
resolved, and then tallied the outcomes. The results of our analysis show 
that more patent disputes are adjudicated on the merits than is commonly 
believed, primarily because final judgments rendered at the pre-trial stage 
on motions for summary judgment seem to be important in the resolution 
of patent cases.  
Previous authors have focused largely on the 5% of cases that are 
terminated through a trial.160 Our results are consistent with such a 
figure.161 However, this fact has come to be interpreted as meaning that 
“95% of all cases settle.”162 The conventional wisdom on this point 
ignores the fact that many cases are resolved through procedural 
terminations.163 But, as we will show, 8% of cases are terminated through 
final rulings on a motion for summary judgment, with the remainder 
 
 
 158. See Somaya, Duration, supra note 79. 
 159. See infra Part III.A. 
 160. See Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 48.  
 161. See infra Part III.C. 
 162. See Hall, supra note 14, at 8; Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 48.  
 163. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial 
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 706–08 (2004).  
[Cases] may be abandoned by the plaintiff. They may end in a default judgment. They may be 
dismissed with prejudice (and treated as an adjudication on the merits) for a litigant’s failure 
to comply with case management orders. They may be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
on which relief can be granted or on a motion for summary judgment. They may be dismissed 
for a lack of either personal or subject matter jurisdiction, which may or may not be a final 
disposition of the underlying dispute.  
Id.  
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disposed of through some form of non-merit disposition.164 Perhaps more 
importantly, while there are very few rulings of patent invalidity, they too 
tend to occur in cases that terminate in a ruling in the pre-trial stage.165 
Thus, focusing on trials does not take into account the greater number of 
cases terminated through rulings that occur “earlier” in the case 
proceedings. 
However, despite the fact that we find more final rulings than previous 
authors, we do not want to overstate the rate of adjudication on the merits 
in patent cases. We still find that approximately 80% of patent cases 
settle.166 And, as we shall see in a later section, the fact that the majority of 
final rulings occur at the pre-trial stage does not mean that rulings in 
patent cases are necessarily “cheap”;167 there is still cause for concern that 
the transaction costs associated with patent cases inhibit the courts’ ability 
to weed out improvidently granted patents. 
A. The Data 
The first step in our analysis was to construct the data set. Rather than 
study a large number of patent cases litigated over a long period of time, 
we chose to extract the patent cases filed in three recent years. Focusing on 
a smaller number of cases (about 6300)168 allowed us to examine the 
history of each case in greater detail than is possible with a large data set. 
In particular, it allowed us not only to exploit publicly available data on 
U.S. court cases,169 but also to examine the docket reports for each 
individual case. Highly detailed knowledge of how cases are resolved will 
help us reach the ultimate goal of determining how patent cases are 
resolved, the costs involved, and how well the courts are fulfilling their 
role of removing “bad” patents. 
Our first decision was the selection of years to be studied. It was 
important that these years meet two criteria. First, given our focus on the 
resolution of cases, the years studied should be sufficiently lagged for the 
vast majority of cases to have terminated. However, it was equally 
important that the years chosen reflect current patent law and civil 
procedure. The years 1995, 1997, and 2000 met these criteria. Cases 
litigated in these years were covered by the most recent developments in 
 
 
 164. See infra Part III.C. 
 165. See infra Part III.D. 
 166. See infra Part III.C.  
 167. See infra Part IV. 
 168. See infra Table 1. 
 169. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 83. 
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patent law. For example, we found that only twenty-three of the cases filed 
in 1995 had terminated before the Markman decision.170 We also found 
that only a very few cases from these years had not terminated; only one 
patent case from 1995171 and twelve cases from 1997172 were still in 
litigation as of this writing. Data was also collected on cases filed in 2000, 
which is even more representative of current patent cases. However, 
among these cases, sixty-two (or 2.5% of the original data) had yet to 
terminate as of this writing.173 While this collection of ongoing cases is a 
small proportion of the total, they are by definition the longest cases, and, 
as will be seen,174 their number is sufficient to blur some of the 
conclusions about the expenditure on cases. 
Once the three years had been selected, we needed to identify the 
patent cases which would constitute our cohorts and collect information on 
how they were resolved. To do so, we relied on the annual database of 
court cases prepared by the Administrative Office of the District Courts.175 
The AO data includes a coding system for all court cases that identifies the 
type of case176 and allowed us to extract all patent cases.177  
 
 
 170. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc), aff’d 517 
U.S. 370 (1996). 
 171. Generation II Ortho v. Med. Tech., No 95-1842 (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 30, 1995). 
 172. Pall Corp. v. Cuno Inc., No. 97-7599 (E.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 30, 1997); Arterial Vascular v. 
Cordis Corp., No. 97-0700 (D. Del. filed Dec. 26, 1997); Roustaei v. Symbol Tech., No. 97-2296 (S.D. 
Cal. filed Dec 23, 1997); Madey v. Duke Univ., No. 97-1170 (M.D.N.C. filed Nov. 5, 1997); Zinser 
Text GMBH v. Electro-Jet, S.A., No 97-0531 (W.D.N.C. filed Oct. 15, 1997); Buckley v. Paccar Inc., 
No. 97-3425 (D. Md. filed Oct. 10, 1997); McElroy MFG Inc. v. Gleasman, No. 97-0751 (N.D. Okla. 
filed Sept. 18, 1997); Ecolab, Inc., v. Paraclipse, Inc., No 97-0304 (D. Neb. filed June 20, 1997); Int’l 
Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., No 97-2678 (C.D. Cal. filed Apr. 18, 1997); Minebea Co. 
Ltd. v. Papst, No 97-0590 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 25, 1997); Plastpro, Inc. v. Therma-Tru Corp., No 97-
1222 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 17, 1997). One case included among the ongoing cases from 1997, Rackman v. 
Microsoft Corp., No. 97-0003 (E.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 2, 1997), had terminated as of June 30, 2006. 
 173. As of June 30, 2006, seven of these cases were reported as terminated in the online docket 
reports. Thus, fifty-five cases were still listed as “ongoing” even as of that date—a sufficient number 
to influence the analysis of case terminations. 
 174. See infra Part IV.A. 
 175. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 83.  
 176. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 83; Federal Court Cases: Integrated Data Base, 2003 
14–16 (Dec. 2004), http://webapp.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/ICPSR-STUDY/04026.xml (follow 
“Download” hyperlink (requires authorization)) (explaining in the project documentation the various 
codes and that patent cases are given a “Nature of Suit” (NOS) code of “830”).  
 177. As we will discuss later, a small number of the cases coded as patent cases appear to have 
been misidentified trademark cases, etc. In addition, a small number of cases were in fact patent cases 
and did not receive the “830” code; other researchers have explored this issue and found the number 
negligible. See Somaya, Strategic Determinants, supra note 79, at 11. Our comparison of the cases 
identified as patent cases by Derwant LitAlert during our study years finds only a small number of 
similar cases, indicating that the number of omitted patent cases is likely to be quite small.  
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In each year we eliminated cases which were coded as a patent case but 
were some other type of litigation—usually a trademark or copyright 
case—or for which data was not available. To avoid double counting, we 
also eliminated cases that were transferred to other districts or 
consolidated with other cases. Table 1 describes the final populations for 
the three years. 
TABLE 1: CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA SET 
 Year 
 1995 1997 2000 
Number of cases identified by the AO 1707 2127 2476 
Miscoded as patent cases178 (168) (183) (195) 
Dockets not available  (17)  (24)  (14) 
Transfers and Consolidations (153) (164) (186) 
Number of Cases used for analysis 1369 1756 2081 
 
The AO database provides a coding system for case resolutions. To 
verify this information and provide greater detail when the AO coding was 
ambiguous, we supplemented this information by examining the online 
docket reports available through the PACER system.179 These reports 
allowed us to collect additional information on how cases were 
administered, how they were resolved, and what kind of remedies were 
applied.  
It should be noted that we construct our database in a different fashion 
than other studies of patent litigation. Most studies of patent litigation 
identify their samples by year of termination and examine how the method 
of termination or time to termination varied across characteristics.180 We 
choose, on the other hand, to examine cases filed in three years and 
observe these cohorts over time. We believe that this allows us to better 
analyze the factors which determine the length of patent litigation.  
Other authors argue that examining suits at time of termination is more 
appropriate, because choosing cohorts based on filing times will lead to 
too many cases that have not terminated, and policy conditions at 
termination will determine outcomes.181 We disagree with both 
 
 
 178. We also dropped a small number of cases which were patent related but involved issues other 
than infringement (such as disputes over inventorship). 
 179. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, PACER Service Center, http://pacer.psc.uscourts. 
gov/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2005). 
 180. See, e.g., Moore, Forum Shopping, supra note 79, at 892. 
 181. See, e.g., Somaya, Duration, supra note 79, at 9. 
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contentions. As noted, most cases are resolved quickly, so we can study 
relatively recent cases with few ongoing cases remaining to cloud the 
analysis. And choosing a cohort by year of termination ignores the earlier 
conditions in the suits’ histories, while it is always possible to “control” 
for conditions in a termination year, as we do through our selection of 
sampling years. Moreover, the reasons why a five-year-old case would 
settle in response to a change in court procedure or policy are very 
different from the reasons why a five-month-old case would settle. A five-
year-old case launched in 1995 evolved in an environment that is very 
different from a five-year-old case launched in 1999, so simply controlling 
for age is insufficient. The history, past environment, and current 
environment in which the case evolved all contribute equally to the 
decision by the parties to settle at any given moment or continue to seek a 
judgment. The appropriate comparison would be to compare the five-year-
old case with other cases filed at the same time to determine why some 
were resolved quickly and why this case took so long, including all such 
variables in the analysis. Only by choosing cohorts based on year of filing 
and controlling for all such factors can we determine what factors 
influence this decision. 
However, it was equally important that the years being analyzed be 
consistent in terms of both patent law and civil procedure; legal and 
procedural consistency is particularly crucial given our interest in 
settlements. Theoretical analysis of litigation suggests that parties are less 
likely to settle when there is a divergence of opinion as to the likelihood of 
the plaintiff winning at trial—if both agree that the plaintiff has a strong 
case, they are likely to settle.182 One source of differing views regarding 
the strength of the case is uncertainty regarding the way the court will 
handle the case, especially the way it will evaluate the property right 
associated with a patent.183 For example, the new procedure for patent 
claim construction, introduced after the Markman ruling, would have 
changed the way the parties in a case evaluated the probability of winning 
at trial and, consequently, the incentives to settle. It was therefore 
important to avoid comparing cases preceding the introduction of the new 
procedure with those following it. The years chosen follow this 
philosophy. In particular, only twenty-three 1995 cases terminated before 
the Markman ruling. Thus, the three cohorts were chosen to allow the 
 
 
 182. For a discussion of the role of uncertainty in the propensity to go to trial, see Lanjouw & 
Lerner, supra note 78, at 4. 
 183. Id. 
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maximum number of cases to be resolved while simultaneously keeping 
the incentives created by courtroom procedure consistent. 
For comparison with previous studies focusing on the year of 
termination, Figure 1 gives the breakdown of the cases in the final data set 
by the year in which they terminate. The three years we describe in this 
paper would loosely correspond to data on cases terminated in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. Thus, our data also provides a reasonably good 
picture of recently terminated cases. 
FIGURE 1: CASES BY YEAR OF TERMINATION 
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B. Methodology for Classifying Case Outcomes 
Once the data set was created, we were able to proceed to our task of 
determining how patent cases are resolved, the costs involved, and what 
role is being played by the courts in the patent system. However, the first 
question to be answered concerns the resolution of cases: are cases being 
adjudicated through to a final decision by the courts, or do parties settle 
their dispute without waiting for a final ruling by the courts? If the vast 
majority of cases are settled along the way, the courts may be fulfilling 
their role of protecting patent rights at relatively low cost. However, a 
small number of final rulings on the merits also means that very few 
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patents are being scrutinized to determine the scope, validity, and 
infringement of patent rights.  
To classify case outcomes, we examined the docket reports for every 
patent case identified in the 1995, 1997, and 2000 cohorts, classified them 
according to the manner in which they were resolved, and then tallied the 
outcomes. If there are any discrepancies between our classifications and 
those of the AO (e.g., we called it a verdict and the AO called it a 
settlement), the docket was re-examined to determine whether this “red 
flag” was the result of our error. 
The results of our analysis show that more patent disputes are 
adjudicated on the merits to a final decision than is commonly believed, 
primarily because final judgments rendered at the pre-trial stage on 
motions for summary judgment or other similar motions seem to be very 
important in the resolution of patent cases. Previous authors have focused 
largely on the 5% of cases that go to trial and then infer a “settlement rate” 
of 95%.184 But this figure ignores the fact that many cases are resolved 
through other pre-trial terminations.185 Moreover, we will show that 6%–
9% of cases are terminated through final rulings granting a motion for 
summary judgment.186 Perhaps more importantly, while there are very few 
rulings of patent invalidity, they tended to occur in cases that terminated in 
a ruling at the pre-trial stage. Thus, focusing exclusively on trials does not 
take into account the greater number of cases terminated through rulings 
that occur earlier in the case proceedings. 
Despite the fact that we find more final rulings than previous authors 
by including final pre-trial rulings on the merits, we do not want to 
overstate the rate of adjudication of patent cases. We still find that 
approximately 80% of patent cases settle.187 As we shall see in a later 
section, the fact that the majority of final rulings occur at the pre-trial stage 
does not mean that rulings in patent cases are necessarily “cheap.”188 
There is still cause for significant concern that the high transaction costs 
associated with patent litigation create incentives for parties to settle and 
inhibit the ability of the courts to rule on the validity and infringement of 
patent rights. 
 
 
 184. Hall et al., supra note 14, at 8; Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 48. 
 185. Hadfield makes a strong case against assuming that any case that does not reach trial is 
automatically a settlement. Hadfield, supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 186. See infra Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
 187. See infra Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
 188. See infra Part IV. 
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Classifying the manner in which cases are resolved is a surprisingly 
difficult task. The Administrative Office of the District Courts requires 
that each case be classified according to a “case disposition” variable.189 
The AO’s actual categories for case disposition are shown in Table 2. As 
we can see, many of these categories—e.g., “dismissed: other”; 
“judgment: other”—are rather ambiguous. The ambiguity of these 
definitions makes it difficult to track the precise disposition of each case. 
Moreover, while several specific categories may be needed to truly 
describe the final outcome of a case, the AO allows cases to be described 
only in one category, and the choice of category is left up to the numerous 
individuals entering data in ninety districts, each with their own particular 
view of the appropriate category. For example, if the two parties reach an 
agreement and request that a consent judgment be entered, the final 
outcome could be coded as either a settlement, a consent judgment, or 
“judgment: other.” Other settlements may be coded as dismissals with or 
without prejudice, voluntary or stipulated dismissals, or just as dismissals. 
There is also some ambiguity about the coding of summary judgment 
rulings—they can also be classified in the “other judgment” category, as 
could a consent judgment, which is more likely to be a settlement.190  
TABLE 2: AO CASE DISPOSITION CODES191 
DISPOSITON 
Cases Transferred or Remanded 
0: transfer to another district 
1: remanded to state court 
10: multi district litigation transfer 
11: remanded to U.S. Agency 
Dismissals 
2: want of prosecution 
3: lack of jurisdiction 
12: voluntarily 
13: settled 
14: other 
Judgment on: 
4: default 
 
 
 189. We choose to concentrate on this variable since, like Hadfield, we find the AO Disposition 
variable more useful than the “Procedural Progress” variable in tracking settlements. See Hadfield, 
supra note 163, at 712. 
 190. In fact, only half of the cases terminating in a successful summary judgment ruling were 
given the AO disposition code of “judgment on motion before trial” in 1997. Over 20% were coded as 
“other judgment” or “other dismissal.” 
 191. See Federal Judicial Center, supra note 83, at 22 
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5: consent 
6: motion before trial 
7: jury verdict 
8: directed verdict 
9: court trial 
15: award of arbitrator 
16: stayed pending bankruptcy 
17: other 
18: statistical closing 
19: appeal affirmed (magistrate judge) 
20: appeal denied (magistrate judge) 
NATURE OF JUDGMENT (only applies to disposition involving a judgment) 
0: no monetary award 
1: monetary award only 
2: monetary award and other 
3: injunction 
*: forfeiture/foreclosure/condemnation, etc. 
5: costs only 
6: costs and attorney fees 
 
To overcome this problem, we compared the AO codes with 
information obtained from the online docket reports available via PACER 
for all the patent cases filed during 1995, 1997, and 2000. All aspects of 
the resolution of each patent case recorded in the docket were entered. For 
example, if it was recorded that a case settled and was officially classified 
as a dismissal without prejudice, we recorded the outcome under both 
dismissal without prejudice and settlement. For dismissed cases, we 
tracked whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice, stipulated, or 
voluntary. For judgments, we tracked whether the judgment was a 
summary judgment, a consent judgment, or other form of final judgment, 
and in whose favor the case was decided. Jury verdicts were recorded as 
were decisions rendered in bench trials. Also recorded was the winning 
party in either kind of trial and whether any damages were awarded. In 
addition, appeals of the final ruling and their outcomes were recorded.192 
But, in particular, the reading of the dockets focused on whether there was 
an explicit reference to a settlement, so that we could accurately determine 
both the rate of adjudication on the merits (either before, during, or after 
trial) and the rate of settlement.193 
 
 
 192. When an appeal resulted in a reversal, the “second stage” of the case was also tracked. The 
numbers cited in the following tables apply to “first stage” resolutions only. 
 193. Note that we use the term settlement to refer to resolution of the question of liability by 
means of an agreement between the parties; agreements occurring after a judgment has been reached 
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The classification of cases under the two systems was compared as a 
test. When we found discrepancies (e.g., AO codes as a transfer when we 
recorded a jury verdict), the dockets were reexamined to determine the 
correct classification when necessary.194  
Finally, each case was classified in the category that was most 
informative about how it was resolved, especially in terms of whether the 
parties resolved the dispute themselves or left it to the courts to do so. In 
general, all forms of judgments implying some form of pre- or post-trial 
adjudication—verdicts, final judgments, or summary judgments—had the 
highest position in the hierarchy according to this principle. Thus, a case 
in which a settlement occurred after the court had decided the issue of 
liability through any sort of ruling would not be classified as a settlement. 
If a ruling on summary judgment was rendered in the case, we examined 
carefully whether that judgment finally allocated liability in the case. For 
instance, if a summary judgment on the issue of infringement or invalidity 
was rendered and the case terminated immediately, that case was viewed 
as terminating with a pre-trial ruling. However, if a summary judgment 
was a partial summary judgment or was followed by pre-trial conferences 
and the like, and then a settlement occurred, the case was classified as a 
settlement.195 Note that only grants of summary judgment which 
completely resolved the case were treated as final rulings on the merits. 
Denials of summary judgment, even though they may also be seen, at 
some level, to be an adjudication on the merits of the case, were not 
treated as final rulings on the merits.  
Finally, cases with final judgments accompanying jury verdicts were 
classified as verdicts. Judgments in which the docket or the AO explicitly 
mentioned a ruling in a bench trial were classified as such. 
After identifying cases terminating in a ruling, we then extracted cases 
that were identified as settlements by the docket or the AO.196 Consent 
 
 
are not classified as “settlements.” 
 194. An additional benefit of “red flagging” these cases, of course, was that it tested for the 
inevitable data entry errors that our team may have committed despite their careful reading of the 
dockets. 
 195. In fact, it is highly probable that the earlier ruling was a strong inducement to settlement, 
since it gave information about the relative strength of the cases on both sides, clarifying the 
probability each side could expect to be successful, and inducing both sides to avoid litigation costs by 
resolving the dispute quickly. 
 196. Cases in which either we or the AO had indicated some form of judgment and the other 
indicated a settlement were examined in detail according to the principle outlined in the preceding 
paragraph. All remaining cases which were called a settlement by us but not by the AO or by the AO 
and not by us were also examined. In every case, the disagreeing party classified the case under one of 
the “probable settlement” categories. 
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judgments that were not explicitly named as a settlement by us (based on 
the court’s docket) or by the AO, stipulated dismissals with or without 
prejudice that were not named as settlements, and consent judgments were 
all considered probable settlements. Voluntary dismissals were classified 
as non-merit dispositions or probable settlements depending on whether 
they occurred before or after the complaint was answered, respectively. An 
alternative view would hold that nearly all voluntary dismissals are in fact 
very early settlements, so all voluntary dismissals should be classified as 
probable settlements. However, we preferred not to force this assumption. 
If we had done so, it would be impossible for a reader disagreeing with our 
position to disaggregate the two types of voluntary dismissals. Under the 
rationale we have employed, any reader believing that all voluntary 
dismissals are probable settlements is free to adjust the number of 
settlements upward.  
This procedure allowed us to count each case in the category which 
best described whether the parties had resolved the disputes themselves at 
some point in the litigation or had continued litigation until a final ruling 
on the merits by the court. Thus, a settlement accompanied by a consent 
judgment would be classified as a settlement. A stipulated dismissal with 
prejudice would be classified as a stipulated dismissal. A jury verdict with 
an accompanying final judgment would be classified as a verdict. For 
some cases classified by the AO as “other dismissal” there was no 
additional information in the docket, and, hence, these cases are left in 
their original category. The final classification categories are listed in 
Table 3. 
TABLE 3: KEY TO CASE RESOLUTION CODES 
Dismissed without prejudice: Terminated with this category; could 
not be assigned to any other category. 
Lack of Jurisdiction: Case was dismissed because court found it did 
not have jurisdiction; usually personal jurisdiction, especially in 
declaratory judgment cases. 
Dismissal due to Want of Prosecution: Explicitly identified by the 
AO or in the docket.  
Default Judgments: Explicitly identified by the AO. In some cases 
classified as “other judgment” by the AO but explicit reference in the 
docket. 
Identified Settlements: Case was identified as settled either by the AO 
or by the docket. All cases where a reference to some form of judgment 
was found in the docket were reviewed, and those in which liability was 
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resolved through some form of judgment other than a consent judgment 
were re-classified in a category referring to the appropriate form of 
judgment.  
Consent judgments: Explicitly identified by the AO or the docket 
without reference to a settlement. Not associated with any other form of 
judgment. 
Voluntary Dismissals: Explicitly identified by AO or the docket 
without reference to a settlement. If a voluntary dismissal occurred 
before the complaint was answered, it is classified as a non-merit 
disposition. Voluntary dismissals occurring after the complaint was 
answered were considered probable settlements. Voluntary dismissals 
with prejudice were also viewed as probable settlements regardless of 
whether the complaint was answered.197 
Agreed Dismissal: Explicitly identified in the docket. 
Stipulated Dismissals: Explicitly identified by AO or the docket 
without reference to a settlement. 
Summary Judgment: Case terminated with a summary judgment. Not 
applied to cases in which there was an interim summary judgment that 
did not totally decide final liability. 
Judgment on Jury Trial: Liability decided through a jury verdict. If a 
final judgment was also issued, still classified as jury trial. 
Judgment on Bench Trial: Liability decided through a bench trial.198  
Judgment as a Matter of Law: Jury verdict, but change in ruling by a 
directed verdict. 
Dismissals with Prejudice: Case dismissed with prejudice with no 
reference to a settlement or any other form of judgment. 
 
As stated above, cases were classified as having terminated in a 
settlement if either the AO coded it as such and/or the docket explicitly 
mentioned a settlement, and there was no previous adjudication deciding 
liability on the merits. It should be noted that the two measures did not 
coincide perfectly. For the 1995 cases, after the correction of settlement 
after adjudication, there were 137 cases for which the docket reported a 
settlement but the AO coded it differently. Among 1997 cases there were 
 
 
 197. Here we also followed Hadfield’s view that voluntary dismissals may reflect a settlement if 
they are with prejudice. Hadfield, supra note 163, at 717. 
 198. Hadfield includes hearings before magistrate judges that end with an appeal among her set of 
adjudicated cases; there were no cases receiving such a code from the AO among our patent cases. See 
id. at 714–15.  
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137 such cases.199 All but a handful of such cases were coded by the AO 
as a consent judgment, voluntary dismissal, other dismissal, or a statistical 
closing.200 Meanwhile, in the 1995 data there were 304 cases and, in the 
1997 data, 372 cases, in which the AO, even after reexamination, reported 
a settlement and the docket did not.201 In all of these cases, the docket 
reported a stipulated dismissal, consent judgment, voluntary dismissal, or 
an undesignated dismissal.202 Thus, in nearly all cases where one measure 
recorded a settlement and the other did not, the alternate classification was 
still consistent with a settlement. In the very small number of cases where 
one source recorded a judgment and the other a settlement, the docket was 
given precedence.203 These results imply that after our correction, the two 
indicators of settlements, the docket and the AO’s codes, were 
consistent.204  
We believe that the system described above provides a clearer and 
more complete picture for a study that focuses on determining how cases 
are actually resolved than previous studies that have relied on the 
categories provided by the AO.205 We are able to assign cases to the most 
 
 
 199. In 1995 these cases were coded by the AO as: seven transfers; two dismissals for lack of 
jurisdiction; one judgment on default; forty-five judgments on consent; seven judgments on motion 
before trial; three verdicts; one bench trial; thirty-one voluntary dismissals; twenty-one “other” 
dismissals; two ”stayed pending bankruptcy”; eight “other” judgments; and nine statistical closings. In 
1997 the AO coded these cases as: one dismissal for lack of prosecution; one judgment on default; 
fifty-three judgments on consent; nine judgments on motion before trial; thirty-two voluntary 
dismissals; thirty-four “other” dismissals; six “other” judgments; and one statistical closing.  
 200. See supra note 199. 
 201. In 1995, twenty-three of these cases terminated with consent judgments, 176 with stipulated 
dismissals, nine with voluntary dismissals, and eighty-seven with general dismissals; in nine cases the 
docket did not give enough information. In 1997, thirty-two cases terminated with consent judgments, 
239 with stipulated dismissals, thirteen with voluntary dismissals, and eighty-four with general 
dismissals; in four cases the docket did not give enough information. 
 202. See supra note 201.  
 203. For 1995, six cases were coded by the AO as terminating in a “motion before trial” and one 
in a jury trial where our reading of the docket found that the cases had actually settled. For 1997 there 
was one settled case which was coded by the AO as a “motion before trial.” Finally for 2000 there 
were seven settled cases that were coded by the AO as a “motion before trial” and one as a jury 
verdict. 
 204. We did not worry about whether the dismissal associated with a settlement or probable 
settlement was with or without prejudice. It is quite common for the last entry of the docket of an 
explicitly settled case to be a “dismissal without prejudice.” If these settlements are in fact falling 
apart, then there are a very large number of cases in which the plaintiff is not exercising his/her right to 
reopen the case. There are a small number of cases (about a dozen) which were reopened after a lapse 
of a year or more because one party was not operating in accordance with the settlement agreement. 
See Hadfield, supra note 163. 
 205. Some researchers might solve this problem by using only the most precise AO categories—
settlements, trials, and rulings on pre-trial motions—and ignoring consent judgments or other 
categories that are somewhat ambiguous. We found very few cases which the AO assigned to the trial 
or pre-trial motion categories that were actually settled. However, many rulings would be lost using 
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meaningful category for the purpose of identifying settlements rather than 
aggregating them into overly broad groups such as “resolved by court 
order or judgment on motion,” which can include both dismissals with and 
without prejudice and grants of summary judgments.206  
C. Case Outcomes: How Many Cases are Adjudicated on the Merits? 
The results of the classification for cases from 1995, 1997, and 2000 
are shown in Tables 4, 5, and 6, respectively.207 Seven to eight percent of 
the cases in our cohorts terminated in grants of summary judgment.208 
Slightly fewer cases terminated in a trial. As a consequence, about 15% of 
all cases—16% of the cases filed in 1995, 13% of the cases filed in 1997, 
and 11% of the cases in filed in 2000—terminated with a court decision, 
i.e., terminated through some sort of court ruling on the merits.209 
However, previous authors have stated that “settlement rates [in patent 
litigation] are high [about 95%].”210 But this figure applies only to cases 
that terminated without a trial, whereas in fact successful summary 
judgment motions appear to be equally important. Thus, the most 
remarkable conclusion of our analysis is that a much larger share of cases 
 
 
this approach, since many cases actually terminating on a pre-trial motion are classified in the 
ambiguous categories. Thus, this alternate procedure could be used for statistically analyzing the 
marginal effects of the parties’ or patents’ characteristics on patent case outcomes. However, losing so 
many rulings will have an impact on the accuracy of such estimates and the size of standard errors 
associated with them. Moreover, this alternate procedure will lead to inaccurate measures of the global 
rate of adjudication and settlement of cases, which is the focus of this study. 
 206. E.g., Moore, Judges, Juries, supra note 79, at 384 n.79 (“[I]n 1998, 24% of cases were 
resolved without court action, 59% of cases were resolved by court order or a judgment on motion, 
12.5% were resolved after the pretrial conference but before trial, and 4.5% of all cases were resolved 
during or after a trial.”).  
 207. These results are largely similar; as a consequence, we believe these years should be largely 
representative of the current distribution of outcomes for patent cases. The percentage of summary 
judgments is lower among the cases filed in 2000. However, until the ongoing cases are resolved, we 
cannot draw any conclusion from this fact. There is also a decrease in the number of voluntary 
dismissals among probable settlements in the 2000 data and a compensating increase in the number of 
stipulated dismissals. This fact has no significant meaning, and probably reflects a stylistic change in 
the language of docket reports. 
 208. For the most part, summary judgments that are not coded by the AO as such were coded as 
some form of dismissal.  
 209. The percentage of rulings from 2000 may be biased downward by the unresolved cases from 
that year. 
 210. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 48; see also Hall, supra note 14, at 
8. Lanjouw and Schankerman were not able to obtain statistically significant results explaining the 
propensity to go to trial. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79. Including additional 
forms of adjudication, as Somaya did, may lead to more significant results, although including all 
adjudicated cases as we do here should reduce standard errors still further.  
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are adjudicated to a final resolution on the merits than has been previously 
suggested in the literature.211 
Nonetheless, we still find that the vast majority of cases settle. For 
cases filed in any of the three years, nearly half of all cases are definitively 
settlements.212 Moreover, we have included in the second column of each 
table several entries for “probable settlements.”213 Cases that terminate in 
a consent judgment have a high probability of being settled, because in 
many such cases the parties request a consent agreement/judgment to 
formalize the settlement.214 A stipulated or agreed dismissal is also often 
an indication that the parties have reached some form of agreement. A 
voluntary dismissal occurring after the complaint is answered can denote 
that the case has settled as well.215 If these cases are included, 
approximately two-thirds of all patent cases terminate in a settlement.216 
Because the reader may question whether all these categories should be 
included among the probable settlements, the various probable settlement 
categories are clearly identified. Having done so, the general conclusion 
remains the same: the majority of patent cases terminate in some form of 
non-adjudicated agreement.217 
 
 
 211. Lanjouw & Schankerman, Small Firms, supra note 79, at 48. 
 212. Table 4 (47% of the 1995 cases definitively settle); Table 5 (46% of the 1997 cases 
definitively settle); Table 6 (47% of the 2000 cases definitively settle). 
 213. Table 4 (18% of the 1995 cases are classified as “probable” settlements); Table 5 (20% of the 
1997 cases are probable settlements); Table 6 (21% of the 2000 cases are probable settlements). 
 214. These agreements are easily identified as settlements because they nearly always state that 
both parties are to pay their own costs, although sometimes an explicit monetary payment is specified. 
They also often include an injunction. Moreover, after reading thousands of docket reports, we became 
familiar with the “style” of a docket report that indicated a settlement: a history of filings, rulings, and 
hearings which are suddenly, and often without warning, terminated by a consent judgment, stipulated 
dismissal, etc. 
 215. Voluntary dismissals with prejudice may denote a settlement as well.  
 216. Table 4 (47% of 1995 cases definitely settle and 65% of cases definitively or probably settle); 
Table 5 (46% of 1997 cases definitively settle and 66% of cases definitively or probably settle); Table 
6 (47% of 2000 cases definitively settle and 68% of cases definitively or probably settle). 
 217. We also find support for Hadfield’s contention that it cannot be assumed that cases that are 
not adjudicated necessarily terminate with a settlement. Hadfield, supra note 163, at 717. Around 5% 
of the cases in each year terminated in some form of non-action: a dismissal without prejudice, 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, or want of prosecution. There were also a small number of default 
judgments. 
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TABLE 4: OUTCOMES, 1995218 
Non-Merit Dispositions Settlements and Probable 
Settlements 
Rulings and Verdicts 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Dismissed  
Without Prejudice 
47 3% Identified 
Settlements 
644 
 
47% Summary 
Judgments 
115 8% 
Lack of  
Jurisdiction 
9 1% Consent 
Judgments 
114 8% Judgment on 
Jury Verdicts 
66 5% 
Want of  
Prosecution 
9 1% Stipulated 
Dismissals 
63 5% Judgment on 
Bench Trials 
17 1% 
Default Judgments 6 0% Agreed 
Dismissals 
3 0% Judgment as a 
Matter of Law219
0 0% 
Voluntary 
Dismissals 
(complaint not 
answered) 
171 13% Voluntary  
Dismissals 
(answered 
complaint) 
65 5% Dismissals 
with Prejudice 
15 1% 
      Arbitration 1 0 % 
Subtotals220 242 18%  889 65%  210 16% 
Other Dismissals 22 
Total of Outcomes 1363 
Ongoing 1 
Unidentified 5 
Total 1369 
 
TABLE 5: OUTCOMES, 1997221 
Non-Merit Dispositions Settlements and Probable 
Settlements 
Rulings and Verdicts 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Outcome Number  
of Cases 
Dismissed  
Without Prejudice 
64 
 
4 % Identified 
Settlements 
800 46% Summary 
Judgments 
133 
 
8% 
Lack of  
Jurisdiction 
23 1% Consent 
Judgments 
120 7% Judgment on 
Jury Verdicts 
41 2% 
Want of  
Prosecution 
19 1% Stipulated 
Dismissals 
95 6 % Judgment on 
Bench Trials 
17 1% 
 
 
 218. Ten cases resolved through a ruling were settled after appeal. We therefore do not believe 
that use of post-appeal outcomes would introduce a substantial qualitative change in our results. 
 219. Directed Verdict. 
 220. Percentages may not total due to rounding. 
 221. Eleven cases resolved through a ruling were settled after appeal. We therefore do not believe 
that use of post-appeal outcomes would introduce a substantial qualitative change in our results. 
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Default Judgments 28 1% Agreed 
Dismissals 
0 0 % Judgment as a 
Matter of Law222
8  0% 
Voluntary 
Dismissals 
(complaint not 
answered) 
221 13% Voluntary  
Dismissals 
(answered 
complaint) 
126 7% Dismissals 
with Prejudice 
24 1% 
      Arbitration 1 0% 
Subtotals223 355 20%  1141 66%  225 13%
Other Dismissals 15 
Total of Outcomes 1736 
Ongoing 12 
Unidentified 8 
Total 1756 
TABLE 6: OUTCOMES, 2000 
Non-Merit Dispositions Settlements and Probable 
Settlements 
Rulings and Verdicts 
Outcome Number  
of Cases 
Outcome Number  
of Cases 
Outcome Number 
of Cases 
Dismissed  
Without Prejudice 
58 3% Identified 
Settlements 
928 47% Summary 
Judgments 
129 7% 
Lack of  
Jurisdiction 
28 1% Consent 
Judgments 
146 7% Judgment on 
Jury Verdicts 
44 2% 
Want of  
Prosecution 
41 2% Stipulated 
Dismissals 
227 12% Judgment on 
Bench Trials 
22 1% 
Default Judgments 31 2% Agreed 
Dismissals 
0 0% Judgment as a 
Matter of Law224
5 0% 
Voluntary 
Dismissals 
(complaint not 
answered) 
241 12% Voluntary  
Dismissals 
(answered 
complaint) 
39 2% Dismissals 
with Prejudice 
23 2% 
      Arbitration  1 0 
Subtotals225 401 20%  1340 68%  224 11%
         
Other Dismissals 7 
Total of Outcomes 1972 
Ongoing 62 
Unidentified 47 
Total 2081 
 
 
 222. Directed Verdict. 
 223. Percentages may not total due to rounding. 
 224. Directed Verdict. 
 225. Percentages may not total due to rounding. 
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D. Rulings of Infringement and Invalidity 
The results from the docket reports support the view that very few 
patent cases are finally adjudicated on the merits. As a consequence, the 
number of cases in which a court has ruled that a patent was infringed or 
that at least one claim of the patent was invalid was also small. We 
considered there to have been a ruling of infringement if the docket 
explicitly stated so or there was a ruling for the plaintiff or a default 
judgment for the plaintiff in a non-declaratory judgment case. By this 
measure, an explicit final ruling of infringement or a judgment for the 
patent holder that could be interpreted as an infringement ruling was found 
in only 277 cases across the three cohorts: eighty-two (or 6.0%) in cases 
from 1995; 103 (or 5.9%) in cases from 1997, and ninety-one (or 4.4%) 
among cases from 2000.226 However, since a settlement is usually 
accompanied by some form of licensing agreement,227 the patentee has, at 
least to some extent, preserved and/or protected her patent rights.  
TABLE 7: RULINGS OF INFRINGEMENT 
 1995 1997 2000 Total 
 Number 
of Cases 
Percent Number 
of Cases 
Percent Number 
of Cases
Percent 
 
Number 
of Cases
 
Percent 
Summary 
Judgment 
22 26.8% 29 28.2% 11 12.1% 62 22.6% 
Jury or 
Bench Trial 
54 65.9% 44 42.7% 47 51.6% 145 52.9% 
Default 
Judgment 
6  7.3% 28 27.1% 33 36.2% 67 24.5% 
Total 82 100% 103 100% 91 100% 274 100% 
Percent of 
All Cases 
6.0%  5.9%  4.4%  5.3%  
 
However, it is certainly possible that some of these patent disputes that 
were resolved through a settlement implicate patent rights that were 
improvidently granted at the outset. Given this scenario, the results for 
rulings of patent invalidity (involving at least one claim) are perhaps a 
greater cause for concern. One claim or more of a patent was ruled invalid 
in only twenty-nine of the 1995 cases (2.1%), forty-one (2.3%) of the 1997 
 
 
 226. There were 84 such cases out of 1369 cases in the 1995 cohort, 103 out of 1756 in the 1997 
cohort, and 90 out of 2081 in the 2000 cohort. 
 227. It should be noted that many consent agreements (nine in 1995, six in 1997, nine in 2000) as 
well as definitive settlements (fifteen in 1995, fourteen in 1997 and fifteen in 2000) include an explicit 
ruling of infringement in the docket to formalize the agreement. 
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cases and forty-eight (2.3%) of the 2000 cases.228 Thus, despite the greater 
ability of the court system to review all evidence pertaining to the validity 
of patents, only a very small number appear to be “weeded out” in a given 
year. While the number seems exceedingly small, it is in fact consistent 
with that found by other researchers.229 
TABLE 8: RULINGS OF INVALIDITY 
 1995 1997 2000 Total 
 Number 
of Cases 
Percent Number 
of Cases 
Percent 
 
Number
of Cases
Percent 
 
 
Number
of Cases
Percent 
Summary 
Judgment 
21 72.4% 36 85.3% 41 85% 96 81.4% 
Jury or 
Bench Trial 
8 27.6% 5 14.6% 7 15% 22 18.6% 
Total 29 100% 41 100% 48 100% 118 100% 
Percent of 
All Cases 
2.1%  2.3%  2.3%  2.3%  
 
 Combined with the small number of reexaminations resulting in total 
or partial revocation of a patent, it seems that on the order of 300 
improvidently granted patents were invalidated each year in the mid-
1990s, while around 300,000 patents were issued each year.230 It seems 
likely that in the face of a high probability of loss of part of her patent 
rights, the patentee would offer the alleged infringer a license that she 
found more advantageous to take, rather than continuing further costly 
litigation proceedings in court. This situation once again emphasizes the 
basic economic calculus at issue here, which takes into account: the 
probability of being adjudicated an infringer and the subsequent remedy or 
damage award at issue, the probability of having one’s patent rights 
invalidated (or rendered unenforceable) in whole or in part, the litigation 
cost that has been incurred by the parties, and the additional cost of 
litigation that looms ahead.  
 
 
 228. One claim or more was ruled invalid in 29 out of 1369 cases in the 1995 cohort, 41 out of 
1756 in the 1997 cohort, and 48 out of 2081 in the 2000 cohort. 
 229. Allison and Lemley, using final written decisions on validity, find only 299 patents litigated 
in 239 cases between 1989 and 1996—an average of just over forty-two patents a year. Allison & 
Lemley, supra note 47, at 194. Because approximately half were ruled invalid, this would mean 
approximately twenty-one rulings of invalidity a year. Id. at 205–07. Moreover, the authors argue that 
the number of invalidity rulings should be increasing, so our findings of twenty-eight rulings of 
invalidity in 1995 and forty-one in 1997 seem reasonable. Id. 
 230. There was a formal ruling of invalidity in twenty-nine of the 1370 cases in 1995 and forty-
one of the 1756 cases in 1997. 
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There is also a substantial difference in the stage of the adjudication 
process in which rulings of infringement and invalidity occur. In the 1995 
cohort, fifty-four out of the eighty-two rulings of infringement occurred as 
a result of a trial, while twenty-three were as a result of a grant of 
summary judgment. Similar results were seen from 1997; for that year, 
forty-four rulings of infringement were as a result of a trial and twenty-
eight were as result of a summary judgment. Among the 2000 cases, forty-
seven of the ninety-one rulings of infringement occurred in a trial while 
eleven were the result of a summary judgment. Thus, across the three 
cohorts, 145 out of the 277 rulings of infringement—approximately 
53%—occurred at trial.231 However, cases with rulings of invalidity are 
much more likely to terminate without ever going to trial. For 1995, only 
eight out of twenty-nine rulings of invalidity occurred as the result of a 
trial; twenty-one were the result of a successful summary judgment 
motion, which may or may not have terminated the case.232 The difference 
between infringement and invalidity rulings is even more apparent in the 
cases filed in 1997. For that year, only five out of forty-one rulings of 
invalidity were granted as a result of a trial, while thirty-one were a result 
of a summary judgment ruling which terminated the case.233 And among 
the 2000 cases, seven of the forty-eight rulings of invalidity occurred in a 
trial while thirty-one were as the result of a motion for summary 
judgment.234 Thus, it appears that rulings of invalidity tend to occur at an 
earlier procedural stage compared with rulings of infringement. 
These results suggest that the issue of invalidity is dealt with earlier in 
the proceedings. Most frequently, when a patent is ruled totally or partially 
invalid, the case terminates with a pre-trial judgment for the alleged 
infringer, although sometimes it settles or litigation continues on other 
remaining issues. This result might seem encouraging, because it implies 
that invalid patents can be revoked by the courts without resorting to an 
expensive trial. However, as we will show in Section IV, obtaining a pre-
trial ruling—particularly pertaining to invalidity—can be very expensive 
 
 
 231. The remaining 44% occurred through default judgments. 
 232. Six of the rulings of invalidity occurred in a trial while thirty-nine were the result of a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 233. Two rulings of invalidity occurred in cases that were dismissed with prejudice; three 
occurred in cases that went on to settle on remaining issues. 
 234. Eight of these rulings of invalidity were in summary judgments rulings in cases which went 
on to settle, one was in a case that proceeded to trial on other issues, and one was in a summary 
judgment ruling in a case that is ongoing. 
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in patent cases.235 In short, termination at an early procedural stage does 
not necessarily mean that the case has been resolved “cheaply.” 
E. Remedies 
Given the small number of rulings of infringement, it is not surprising 
that damages are only awarded in a small number of cases. Damages were 
awarded in only forty-two non-settled cases from 1995 (of which twenty-
nine were jury verdicts), fifty-four non-settled cases from 1997 (of which 
twenty-three were jury verdicts) and thirty non-settled cases from 2000 (of 
which nineteen were jury verdicts).236 The average amount awarded in 
these cases was $7.4 million, $3.3 million, and $2.1 million, 
respectively.237 Consent agreements and settlements also sometimes 
carried awards that were listed in the docket; there were fourteen such 
cases from 1995, twenty-three from 1997, and thirty-three from 2000.238 
The amount changing hands in such cases was sometimes substantial. 
There were three cases with consent judgments that carried major damages 
from 1995: one for $1.5 million in central California and two for 
approximately $5 million each in southern Iowa.239 From 1997, one case 
in Connecticut with a consent judgment cited damages of $1 million.240 
Among all cases filed in 2000, fourteen cases awarded damages in excess 
of $1 million,241 one of which was a case in the Eastern District of 
Virginia in which $2 million was awarded and another was a case in the 
 
 
 235. See infra Part IV.D. 
 236. Table 9. 
 237. Table 9. 
 238. Table 9. 
 239. Chiuminatta Concrete v. Cardinal Indus., No. 95-4995 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1997); Johnson v. 
Van-Wall Equip., No. 95-80853 (S.D. Iowa July 1, 1996); and Portec Inc. v. Hustler Conveyor Co., 
No. 95-80637 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 16, 1996). 
 240. Omega Eng’g v. Kokusai Chart, No. 97-1373 (D. Conn. May 12, 1998).  
 241. Rates Tech. v. All Computer Tech., No. 00-256 (S.D. N.Y. Jan. 13, 2000); Bic Corp. v. First 
Prominence Co. et al., No. 00-7155 (S.D. N.Y. Sept. 21, 2000); TI Group Auto. Sys. (USA), Inc. v. 
VDO N. Am. L.L.C., No. 00-432 (D. Del. Apr. 25, 2000); BBA Nonwovens v. Superior Nonwovens, 
No. 00-2764 (D. S.C. Sept. 6, 2000); IP Global, Ltd. v. Thomson Consumer, No. 00-361 (E.D. Va. 
May 15, 2000); Poly-America, Inc. v. Serrot Int’l, No. 00-1457 (N.D. Tex. July 6, 2000); Monsanto 
Co. v. Ralph, No. 00-135 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 28, 2000); Asian Commc’ns v. Zi Corp., No 00-989 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 21, 2000); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., Inc., No. 00-1826 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2000); O2 
Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Monolithic Power Sys., Inc., No. 00-4071 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2000); Int’l Rectifier 
v. IXYS Corp., No. 00-6756 (C.D. Cal. June 22, 2000); Suntiger Inc. v. Ronald Anson, No. 00-6875 
(C.D. Cal. June 26, 2000); Laser Tech. Inc. v. Nikon, Inc., No. 00-272 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2000); 
Hodgdon Powder v. Clean Shot, No. 00-8394 (S.D. Fla. May 15, 2000). 
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Central District of California in which $4.9 million was awarded in 
settlement agreements.242  
TABLE 9: DAMAGES 
Damages Awarded 
 1995 1997 2000 
Number of Cases with Monetary Awards    
 Jury Verdicts 29 23 19 
 Other Rulings 13 31 11 
 Consent Judgments and Settlements243 14 23 33 
 Total 56 77 63 
Average Award Size (in millions) 7.4 3.3 2.1 
 
Permanent injunctions are more common, though they seem to play a 
different role in the process. As shown in Table 10, injunctions are most 
commonly found in consent judgments and even formal settlements, most 
likely as a mechanism for formalizing the agreement. They are also 
sometimes employed in default judgments as a way of controlling an 
infringing party who has not presented himself in court. However, they are 
rare in adjudicated cases: only 19% of cases ending in trials and only 4% 
of those terminating in summary judgments included an injunction.244 
Note that these numbers correspond only to those cases involving grants of 
permanent injunction and not to any grants of preliminary injunctions in 
patent cases.  
 
 
 242. IP Global, Ltd. v. Thomson Consumer, No. 00-361 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2000) and Suntiger 
Inc. v. Ronald Anson, No. 00-6875 (C.D. Cal. June 26, 2000), respectively. 
 243. In these cases, a monetary payment was explicitly noted as part of the consent judgment or 
settlement in the case docket. 
 244. Over the three years, 42 of the 220 cases terminating through a trial granted a permanent 
injunction, while 17 out of the 382 cases terminating on a final ruling through summary judgment 
granted a permanent injunction. 
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TABLE 10: INJUNCTIONS 
 1995 1997 2000 Total 
 Number 
of Cases 
Percent of 
Injunctions 
Number 
of Cases 
Percent of 
Injunctions 
Number
of Cases
Percent of 
Injunctions 
Number
of Cases
Percent of 
Injunctions 
Summary 
Judgment 
11 9% 5 4% 1 1% 17 4% 
Jury 
Verdict 
13 12% 8 6% 9 6% 30 7% 
Bench Trial 4 4% 2 2% 4 2% 10 3% 
Definitive 
Settlement 
43 36% 60 47% 67 41% 170 42% 
Consent 
Judgment 
43 38% 38 29% 65 42% 146 36% 
Default 
Judgment 
1 1% 9 7% 13 8% 23 5% 
Other 1 1% 6 4% 2 1% 9 2% 
Total 116 100% 129 100% 161 100% 405  
Percent of 
All Cases 
8.4%  7.4%  7.7%  7.9%  
IV. EXPENDITURE ON CASES 
As discussed in the previous section, the use of court docket reports, in 
addition to the information provided by the AO, demonstrates that more 
patent cases are decided through final rulings on the merits than was 
previously thought. Nonetheless, nearly 70% of all patent cases settle.245  
Economic theory suggests that settlements are a mechanism used by 
the parties to avoid the high litigation costs of patent cases.246 If a ruling—
especially a ruling of invalidity—turns out to be expensive, the incentive 
to settle the dispute will be high. Individuals will balance their private 
benefits against the costs of continuing litigation.247 However, they will 
not include in their calculus the public benefits in reduced research costs 
or the cheaper production of goods that may occur when a wrongly 
granted patent is ruled invalid.248 Thus, if rulings—particularly rulings of 
invalidity—are expensive, too few cases will be pursued to a final 
adjudication of validity or infringement on the merits. 
For this reason, we were particularly interested in measuring the costs 
associated with the case resolutions identified in the previous section. 
Unfortunately, it is nearly impossible to directly measure litigation costs 
 
 
 245. See supra Part III.C. 
 246. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 78; see also Yeazell, supra note 45. 
 247. See Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 78; see also Yeazell, supra note 45. 
 248. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 44; see also Landsman, supra note 54. 
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for the general population of patent cases. To overcome this problem, we 
have developed three proxies for costs: length of time to termination, 
number of documents filed in court, and, for the 1997 and 2000 cohorts, 
whether the cases reached the stage of filing a motion for summary 
judgment. Time to termination is a traditional measure of the resources 
expended on a court case.249 However, while it has a strong intuitive 
appeal, this measure is also likely to be inaccurate. There can be long 
delays in scheduling court hearings and periods of inactivity that are not 
necessarily associated with higher costs. The number of documents filed in 
the case is probably more closely correlated with actual costs, particularly 
in the form of “billable hours” of attorney time. However, this measure 
has lower intuitive appeal; it is less obvious what constitutes “a lot” of 
documents than what constitutes a “long duration” case. Finally, costs 
begin to escalate when cases reach the claim construction or summary 
judgment stage. Even if the case settles after that point, there will have 
been a considerable expenditure of resources. Therefore, reaching the 
stage of filing a motion of summary judgment can be an indication that the 
level of expenditure in the case was moderate to high. 
Using these three measures, we will show that the average level of 
expenditure over all patent cases is relatively modest. However, final 
rulings by a court after a trial or a grant of summary judgment are found to 
be expensive. In other words, even cases that do not reach the trial stage 
but terminate with a successful motion for summary judgment involve a 
considerable expenditure of resources. As a consequence, our previous 
finding that rulings of invalidity commonly occur at the summary 
judgment stage may be somewhat misleading or at least incomplete: 
terminating early, prior to trial, does not necessarily imply little 
expenditure of resources. 
A. Level of Expenditure: All Cases 
Table 11 reports our results for the duration of cases filed in 1995, 
1997, and 2000. These results demonstrate that on the average, 
expenditures in patent cases are not excessively high. Among cases in the 
1995 cohort, the average number of days to case termination was 418, 
while the median number of days to termination was 298.250 Among the 
cases filed in 1997, the average number of days to termination was 466, 
 
 
 249. See Somaya, Duration, supra note 79. 
 250. Table 11. 
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while the median number of days was 299.251 For cases filed in 2000, the 
mean and median of duration were 443 and 295 days respectively.252 Thus, 
in all three years, 50% of cases were resolved within ten months.253 
However, as shown in Figure 2, there are a small number of cases with 
exceedingly long durations. In particular, as the larger difference between 
the mean and the median demonstrates, the 1997 curve has a somewhat 
longer “tail.” Sixty-six cases filed in that year had a duration which 
equaled or exceeded five years.254 
TABLE 11: TIME TO RESOLUTION: ALL CASES 
 1995 1997 2000255 
 Number Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
1 Quarter 196 14 211 13 255 12 
2 Quarters 250 18 344 20 409 20 
3 Quarters 195 14 245 14 299 14 
4 Quarters 152 11 213 12 253 12 
5 Quarters 128 9 164 9 169 8 
6 Quarters 100 7 104 6 144 7 
7 Quarters 73 5 86 5 110 5 
8 Quarters 37 3 64 4 80 4 
More Than  
8 Quarters 238 17 325 19 362 17 
Total 1369 100 1756 100 2081 100 
Average 
Number of Days 
 
418  
 
466  443  
Median  
Number of Days 298  299  295  
 
 
 251. Table 11. 
 252. Table 11. 
 253. There are a small number of cases with very long durations and numerous documents filed. 
One case from 1995, twelve from 1997, and sixty-two from 2000 were still ongoing as of this writing. 
For the 1995 and 1997 cohorts, the ongoing cases are largely irrelevant in analyzing case duration. 
Given the significant number of ongoing cases from 2000, these cases were assumed to “terminate” on 
February 15, 2006, to reduce the downward bias of duration calculations by as much as possible. 
 254. See Figure 2. 
 255. Case durations for 2000 are calculated using the assumption that the sixty-two ongoing cases 
terminate on Febuary 15, 2006. The reader should note that truncating the case history in this manner 
will reduce the estimated mean and percentiles, especially the higher percentiles. 
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FIGURE 2: DURATION OF PATENT CASES 
FIGURE 2A. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Pe
rc
en
t o
f C
as
es
 U
nr
es
ol
ve
d
0 360 720 1080 1440 1800 2160 2520 2880
Number of Days
Duration of Patent Cases, 1995
 
FIGURE 2B. 
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FIGURE 2C. 
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As noted above, one problem with using time to termination as a 
measure of expenditure is that it is possible for some cases to have long 
periods of inactivity. These periods are still a problem for the parties: no 
firm or manager likes to have unresolved legal issues, and there may be 
financial implications such as market valuation. Moreover, such periods 
reduce the accuracy of time as a measure of expenditure on patent cases. 
Thus, a second measure of expenditure on cases was employed by 
exploiting the enumeration of documents filed in the docket reports. The 
number of documents filed may give a better indication of the number of 
“billable hours” paid by the parties and, therefore, direct expenditures. 
The number of documents filed in patent cases supports the conclusion 
that expenditure on most cases may not be large. As shown in Table 12, 
the average number of documents filed was approximately sixty-five while 
the median was approximately twenty-four across all three years.256 Figure 
3 demonstrates that, as with the time to termination, the number of 
 
 
 256. See Table 12. 
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documents filed in cases has a long trail of cases with numerous 
documents.257 However, by this measure, expenditure on patent cases was 
strikingly similar for the three cohorts, both in terms of the distributions 
displayed in Figure 3, and in the summary statistics describing that 
distribution summarized in Table 12. 
TABLE 12: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED: ALL CASES 
 1995 1997 2000258 
 Number259 Percentage Number Percentage Number Percentage
Less than 10  362 26% 461 26% 491 24% 
10–19 235 17% 347 20% 387 19% 
20–49 326 24% 392 22% 523 25% 
50 or More  443 34% 556 32% 680 33% 
Total 1366 100% 1756 100% 2081 100% 
Average Number of 
Documents 66  65  65  
Median Number of 
Documents 25  24  24  
 
 
 257. The maximum number of documents was 1042 in 1995 and 1386 in 1997. The actual 
averages were sixty-six in 1995 and sixty-five in 1997. The medians were twenty-five and twenty-
four, respectively. 
 258. The tallies of documents for 2000 are calculated using the number of documents filed for the 
sixty-two ongoing cases as of February 15, 2006. The same caveat as for case durations applies.  
 259. Number of documents was not available for four cases in Nevada in 1995 and 1997 due to 
the format of the online docket reports. 
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FIGURE 3: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED 
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FIGURE 3C. 
Cases by Number of Documents Filed, 2000
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Finally, we determined which cases had reached a stage at which a 
motion for summary judgment had been filed. Certain events such as 
claim construction or motions for summary judgment during the course of 
litigation indicate that the parties are investing significant resources in the 
litigation. Filing a motion for summary judgment is one such event. We 
found that in 473 cases in the 1997 cohort—i.e., approximately 27% of all 
cases filed that year—a motion for summary judgment was filed.260 In the 
2000 cohort, a summary judgment motion was filed in 490, or 24%, of all 
cases.261 The significance of this measure will be seen later when we 
examine the characteristics of cases terminating with various outcomes.262 
 
 
 260. We found 473 out of 1756 cases where a motion for summary judgment had been filed. 
 261. There were 2081 cases in the 2000 cohort. Summary judgment motions were filed in 490 of 
these cases. 
 262. We also attempted to track cases in which Markman claim construction hearings were held 
but found that even in 1997 and 2000, only 10–12% of the case dockets explicitly mention even an 
exchange of documents discussing claim construction. Since the Markman hearing to construe the 
claims of the patents at issue is now common in patent litigation, we are unsure whether this result 
reflects the fact that the procedure was not effectively integrated into the court system even as late as 
2000 or if it was simply not common to report the proceedings in docket reports as of that date. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p237 Kesan Ball book pages2.doc 12/7/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
288 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:237 
 
 
 
 
B. How do Expenditures in Cases Differ Across Outcomes? 
As we have shown, despite the conventional wisdom, the actual 
expenditure on patent cases may be relatively modest. However, it is also 
true that the vast majority of patent cases settle. The question remains: is 
the low level of expenditure actually due to the high number of 
settlements? 
Tables 13 and 14 break down the expenditures levels by the manner in 
which the case was resolved. As might be expected, cases which proceed 
to a final court ruling on the merits263 entail a greater expenditure of 
resources than those which settle. The average number of days to 
termination for cases with a final court ruling was 679 for 1995, 867 for 
1997, and 780 for 2000; the averages among settlements were 421, 439, 
and 392, respectively.264 Thus, the number of days to termination was 30–
50% higher in cases terminating in rulings than in those that settled over 
the three years.265  
TABLE 13: DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF DAYS TO TERMINATION BY 
TYPE OF OUTCOME 
 1995 1997 2000266 
 Percentiles Percentiles Percentiles 
 
Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mean
 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Rulings 679 166 318 564 1002 1358 867 217 414 685 1001 2110 780 213 399 658 1067 1636
Settlement 421 105 188 329 540 920 439 103 182 328 558 883 392 95 179 313 520 795 
Settlement  
or  
Probable  
Settlement 
421 96 172 322 540 957 440 93 176 315 533 922 404 91 171 314 532 852 
All Cases 418 74 139 299 545 1012 466 77 151 299 575 1015 443 81 143 295 566 1043
 
 
 263. Summary judgment, verdict or judgment in a trial, and dismissals with prejudice. 
 264. The total number of days across cases with rulings was 148,920 in 1995 and 192,375 in 1997, 
while the number of cases with rulings was 219 and 225, respectively. The total number of days in 
cases terminating through settlements was 271,346 in 1995 and 350,322 in 1997, while the number of 
cases was 643 and 798, respectively. 
 265. Statistically, we can reject the hypothesis that the average number of days to termination is 
equal in the two groups of cases against the alternative that cases with rulings on the average take 
longer at the 1% level of significance. 
 266. In addition to the previous caveats, the reader should remember that we do not know how the 
ongoing cases from 2000 will be terminated. 
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 FIGURE 4: DURATION OF CASES TERMINATED WITH SETTLEMENTS OR 
PROBABLE SETTLEMENTS 
FIGURE 4A. 
FIGURE 4B. 
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FIGURE 4C. 
 
FIGURE 5: DURATION OF CASES TERMINATING IN RULINGS 
FIGURE 5A. 
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FIGURE 5B. 
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The contrast was equally stark when the number of documents filed 
was used as a measure of expenditure. The average number of documents 
for cases terminated with a final court ruling was 174 for 1995, 184 for 
1997, and 214 for 2000; for settlements, it was 56, 55 and 49, 
respectively.267 Thus, over three times as many documents were filed in 
the average case terminating in a ruling than in the average case that 
settled.268 As demonstrated in Figures 8, 11 and 14, this result means that 
the vast majority of cases terminating through rulings had more than fifty 
documents filed, while only a small proportion of those terminating in a 
settlement fell into this category;269 cases terminating in rulings also seem 
to involve a greater number of filed documents.270 
TABLE 14: DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED BY TYPE OF 
OUTCOME 
 1995 1997 2000271 
 Percentiles Percentiles Percentiles 
 
Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Mean
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Rulings 174 24 56 112 236 394 184 34 64 118 228 442 214 30 70 120 260 440 
Settlement 56 7 14 27 60 130 55 7 13 25 63 129 49 8 14 25 55 117 
Settlement  
or  
Probable  
Settlement 
54 7 13 25 58 134 56 7 13 25 61 129 52 7 13 26 58 125 
All Cases 66 4 10 25 70 180 65 4 10 24 68 158 64 4 10 24 67 155 
 
 
 
 267. The total number of documents across cases with rulings was 38,106 in 1995 and 41,175 in 
1997, while the number of cases with rulings was 219 and 225, respectively. The total number of 
documents in cases terminating through settlements was 35,365 in 1995 and 44,688 in 1997, while the 
number of cases was 643 and 798, respectively. 
 268. In 1995, 174 documents in cases with rulings versus 56 in cases which settled; in 1997, 184 
in cases with rulings versus 55 in cases which settled. 
 269. In 1995, 197 out of 642 cases terminating through settlements versus 171 out of 219 cases 
terminating through final rulings had more than fifty documents. In 1997, 244 out of 798 cases 
terminating through settlements versus 175 out of 225 terminating through final rulings had more than 
fifty documents. 
 270. Again, the hypothesis that the average number of documents is equal in the two types of 
cases against the alternative that on average more documents are filed in cases terminating with rulings 
is rejected at the 1% level of significance. 
 271. Again, these results are preliminary pending resolution of the ongoing cases from 2000. 
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FIGURE 6: DOCUMENTS FILED IN 1995 CASES WHICH SETTLED OR 
PROBABLY SETTLED 
 
FIGURE 7: DOCUMENTS FILED IN 1995 CASES TERMINATED WITH 
RULINGS 
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FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED BY TYPE OF OUTCOME, 1995 
 
FIGURE 9: DOCUMENTS FILED IN 1997 CASES WHICH SETTLED OR 
PROBABLY SETTLED 
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FIGURE 10: DOCUMENTS FILED IN 1997 CASES TERMINATED WITH RULINGS 
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FIGURE 11: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED BY TYPE OF OUTCOME, 1997 
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FIGURE 12: DOCUMENTS FILED IN 2000 CASES WHICH SETTLED OR 
PROBABLY SETTLED 
 
FIGURE 13: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS IN 2000 CASES TERMINATED 
WITH RULINGS 
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FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF DOCUMENTS FILED BY TYPE OF OUTCOME, 2000 
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median number of documents filed was over four times as great.272 In fact, 
the median case terminating in a ruling from 1997 would have fallen at the 
ninety-sixth percentile among settled cases in terms of number of filed 
documents. Apparently, the relatively low average expenditure observed 
across all patent cases is biased downward by the low expenditures in the 
settled cases. The distributions of documents filed in the 2000 cohort 
display similar trends. 
A final method for measuring the level of expenditure on cases is to 
determine the stage in the litigation process at which the case terminated. 
For example, at what stage in the litigation process did the settlements take 
place?273 Certain events in the course of litigation are indicators that the 
parties have invested considerable resources. One such event is the filing 
of motions for summary judgment. We found that a motion for summary 
judgment was filed in 27% of all cases filed in 1997 and 24% of the cases 
filed in 2000 as of this writing.274 However, a summary judgment motion 
was filed in only 25% of the cases from 1997 that definitively settled and 
20% of the 1997 cases that definitely or probably settled.275 For the 2000 
cases, summary judgment motions were filed in 18% of the settled cases 
and 20% of the probable settlements.276 Thus, all our measures suggest 
that the relatively low expenditure on patent cases is, at least in part, due 
to the propensity to settle these disputes. 
C. Expenditure by Type of Ruling: Trials and Summary Judgments 
In general, it is assumed that the most expensive cases are those that go 
to trial.277 As shown in Table 15, our results verify this assertion. 
However, it is also obvious that the cases that terminated through 
successful summary judgments motions also required a significant level of 
 
 
 272. In 1997, the median number of days to termination of a case terminating through a final 
ruling was 685, while the median among cases which settled was 328. Also, in 1997 the median 
number of documents among cases terminating through rulings was 118, while the median among 
settled cases was twenty-five. 
 273. “[S]ettlement at an early stage, before a pretrial motion is decided, takes place under 
information conditions that differ from those that will prevail on the eve of trial; discovery may or may 
not proceed while the parties wait for a decision on a pretrial motion.” Hadfield, supra note 163, at 
708. 
 274. In 1997, the average number of documents in cases ending in a trial was 276, and in cases 
ending through summary judgments, 169.  The medians were 224 and 105, respectively. See infra 
Table 15. 
 275. The average length of cases terminating through a trial was 873 days in 1995 and 951 days in 
1997.  The medians were 862 and 776, respectively. See infra Table 15. 
 276. See infra Table 15. 
 277. See Gross & Syverud, supra note 44, at 320. 
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resources, particularly in 1997. The average case from 1997 terminating 
through a trial endured just under two-and-a-half years; however, cases 
from that year terminating through a successful summary judgment ended 
in only about two fewer months.278 A similar result can be observed when 
medians are compared: 50% of cases terminating through a trial lasted 
approximately two years, while the median among cases terminating 
through a summary judgment was only about four months fewer than that 
figure.279 And the decline in the ratio of expenditure on trials to 
expenditure on summary judgments is even more evident when measured 
in terms of documents filed. For 1995, the average number of documents 
filed in cases that ended with trials was two-and-a-half times the average 
number filed in cases terminating in successful summary judgments, and 
the median number filed was about three times as great.280 In 1997, the 
average number filed in cases with a trial was only about 60% greater, and 
the median was about twice as great.281  
TABLE 15: EXPENDITURE ON CASES WITH RULINGS BY TYPE OF RULING 
 Number of Days Number of Documents 
 1995 1997 2000282 1995 1997 2000283 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Cases 
Terminating in 
Summary 
Judgments 
567 445 900 651 707 589 110 79 169 105 150 99 
Cases 
Terminating 
Through Trials 
873 862 951 776 1127 1037 282 233 276 224 339 295 
 
To some extent, these results suggest that there may be a trend in the 
level of expenditure across the two types of rulings. As shown in Table 15, 
the average duration of a case terminating through a trial grew by about 
9% between the 1995 and 1997 cohorts. The median length actually 
 
 
 278. The average length of a case terminating through a trial was 951 days in 1997; the average 
for cases terminating in a motion for summary judgment was 900. See infra Table 15. 
 279. In 1997, the median length for cases ending in a trial was 776 days; for cases ending in a 
summary judgment the median length was 651 days. See infra Table 15. 
 280. In 1995, on average 282 documents were filed in cases ending through a trial and 110 in 
cases ending in a summary judgment. The median number of documents was 233 for cases ending in a 
trial versus 79 for cases ending in summary judgments. See infra Table 15. 
 281. In 1997, the average number of documents in cases ending in a trial was 276, and in cases 
ending through summary judgments, 169. The median number for tried cases was 224, and for cases 
ending in a summary judgment, 105. See infra Table 15. 
 282. See supra note 266. 
 283. See supra note 266. 
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decreased.284 However, the average duration of cases terminating with 
summary judgments from 1997 was nearly 60% more than that of 1995, 
increasing from 567 to 900 days.285 The median duration among summary 
judgment cases increased by nearly 50% from 445 to 651 days.286 A 
similar result can be seen in Table 15 among the number of documents 
filed, which showed very little change among cases terminating in trials 
between 1995 and 1997. However, the median number of documents 
among cases terminating through a summary judgment also increased by 
about 40%.287 Whichever measure of expenditure is used, the overall cost 
of a trial seems to be growing at a relatively slow rate, while that of a 
summary judgment is increasing rapidly and was only somewhat less 
costly than a trial in 1997. These results can also be seen in 2000 in 
Figures 5c and 12. These diagrams demonstrate somewhat of a shift 
toward longer trial cases, and a more pronounced shift among summary 
judgment cases.  
The significant difference in duration and number of documents filed in 
cases resolved through summary judgment for the 1997 cases compared 
with the 1995 cases is consistent with the changes brought about by the 
Markman decision that invigorated claim construction as a threshold legal 
issue in patent litigation. As a preliminary matter, the number of cases 
resolved through summary judgment did not change significantly between 
the 1995 and 1997 cohorts;288 the 1997 filed cases simply took much 
longer. The increased importance placed on first construing the claims 
before addressing infringement or invalidity after Markman necessitates 
the allotment of significant resources to the step of claim construction 
before (or concurrent with) filing motions for summary judgment. Hence, 
it is not surprising that in the 1997 cases more resources were expended 
earlier in the litigation. It follows that this early emphasis on claim 
construction would show up in the form of more expenditures in cases 
such as those resolved through a grant of summary judgment after 
 
 
 284. The average length of cases terminating through trial was 873 days in 1995 and 951 days in 
1997. The medians were 862 and 776, respectively. See supra Table 15. 
 285. See supra Table 15. 
 286. See supra Table 15. 
 287. The average number of documents in cases terminating through trials dropped from 282 to 
276 while the median went from 233 to 224. The average number of documents in a case terminating 
in a summary judgment grew from 110 to 169 while the median grew from 79 to 105. See supra Table 
15. 
 288. See supra Tables 4 and 5 (123 cases (9%) resolved through summary judgment in the 1995 
cohort and 133 cases (8%) resolved through summary judgment in the 1997 cohort). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss2/1
p237 Kesan Ball book pages2.doc 12/7/2006  
 
 
 
 
 
2006] RESOLUTION OF PATENT DISPUTES 301 
 
 
 
 
Markman hearings had taken a foothold in 1997 compared with the days 
prior to or just following the Markman decision in 1995.  
These results call into question the conventional view that cases which 
go to trial are much more expensive than those cases where there is a final 
court ruling in the pre-trial stage. Figures 15–19 make this result even 
more obvious. As these figures demonstrate, for 1995 the majority of cases 
ending with final rulings lasting two years or more went to trial.289 But for 
1997, the majority of such cases terminated through a pre-trial final 
ruling.290 The results are similar when expenditure is measured by the 
number of documents displayed in Figures 20 and 21. In 1997, among 
cases terminating through a final ruling in which more than 100 
documents were filed, 60% terminated in the pre-trial stage.291  
Of course, two years are insufficient to truly diagnose any form of 
long-term trend. This caveat is especially true given the fact that a 
significant number of the most expensive cases from the 2000 cohort are 
unresolved, and the preliminary data from that year provides weaker 
support for the existence of the trend observed between the 1995 and 1997 
cohorts. The ratio of expenditure on trial terminations to that of summary 
judgment terminations in cases from 2000 is less than or equal to the ratio 
among the 1995 cases for both measures of expenditure. A full 
understanding of expenditures on cases cannot be calculated until the 
remaining sixty-odd cases are resolved. However, the results from the 
latest year in which nearly all cases are resolved—1997—suggest that 
despite the fact that they may occur earlier in the process of litigation, 
summary judgments are increasingly being used to resolve complicated 
patent cases. The fact that few cases go to trial does not mean that there 
are only a few cases with a high level of expenditure. In other words, 
expenditures in patent cases may not be as closely related to the initiation 
of a trial as is commonly thought. 
 
 
 289. In 1995, fifty-four cases terminating through trials lasted more than two years, while only 
thirty-six cases terminating through a successful motion on summary judgment lasted that long.  
 290. In 1997, thirty-one cases terminating through a trial lasted more than two years, while sixty-
two cases terminating on a motion for summary judgment did so. 
 291. And these results do not take into account the cases in which summary judgment motions 
were filed which did not lead to a resolution and the case settled before going to trial. In fact, about 
half of the 300 cases where more than 100 documents were filed actually settled; in 75% of these, a 
motion for summary judgment had been filed.  
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FIGURE 15: DURATION OF CASES TERMINATING WITH SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
FIGURE 15A. 
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FIGURE 15B. 
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FIGURE 15C. 
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FIGURE 16: DURATION OF CASES TERMINATING THROUGH TRIALS 
FIGURE 16A. 
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FIGURE 16B. 
 
FIGURE 16C. 
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FIGURE 17: DURATION OF CASES WITH RULINGS, 1995 
 
FIGURE 18: DURATION OF CASES WITH RULINGS, 1997 
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FIGURE 19: DURATION OF CASES WITH RULINGS, 2000 
 
FIGURE 20: DOCUMENTS FILED IN CASES TERMINATING WITH SUMMARY 
JUDGMENTS 
FIGURE 20A. 
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FIGURE 20B. 
 
FIGURE 20C. 
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FIGURE 21: DOCUMENTS FILED IN CASES TERMINATING THROUGH 
TRIALS 
FIGURE 21A. 
 
FIGURE 21B. 
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Number of Documents Filed in Cases Terminating Through Trials, 1997
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FIGURE 21C. 
 
D. Invalidity Rulings: The Cost of Revoking an Improvidently Granted 
Patent 
We can no longer make the argument that a case which terminates 
through a pre-trial ruling is necessarily much less expensive than one 
which goes to trial. This fact is particularly worrisome given the small 
number of rulings of invalidity observed in the data and the stage at which 
those rulings are made. We previously noted the fact that rulings of 
invalidity tend to occur at an early stage in the litigation: half of the 
twenty-nine rulings of invalidity rendered for 1995 cases were through 
summary judgments and three-quarters of the invalidity rulings for 1997 
cases occurred through a pre-trial judgment.292 Given the conventional 
view of the expense of trials, such a result might be considered 
encouraging, implying that the courts can dispose of the validity issue 
somewhat early in the process. If this were the case, we would have less 
cause to worry that the expense of seeking a ruling of invalidity is 
inhibiting defendants from pursuing such a ruling.293 
 
 
 292. See supra Part III.D. 
 293. Rulings of infringement obtained at the pre-trial stage can also be expensive. 
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However, given the trend in expenditures for cases terminating in 
rulings of summary judgment, it is clear that there is still cause for 
concern. The average number of days to termination in cases with a ruling 
of invalidity was 714 days (median 589) for 1995, and the average number 
of documents filed was 187 (median 178).294 For 1997, the average 
number of days to termination in such cases was 853 (median 612), and 
the average number of documents was 225 (median 121).295 Among cases 
from 2000, the average number of days to termination in cases with a 
ruling of invalidity was 874 (median 808) while the average number of 
documents was 221 (median 140).296 Thus, despite their tendency to be 
adjudicated “early” without a trial, rulings of invalidity are not less 
expensive than rulings on patent infringement which seem to come 
later.297  
These results suggest that much of the expense associated with patent 
litigation occurs long before the parties appear before a jury. The process 
of filing motions for summary judgment on invalidity involves extensive 
investigation and study of the relevant prior art, including activities of 
third parties and testimony by expert witnesses. As the costs mount, the 
defendant in an infringement suit is likely to find an offer of a license 
more and more attractive. And he will only be taking his own costs—not 
the potential benefits or costs to society—into account in deciding whether 
or not to accept such an offer. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
This work is part of a growing empirical effort among economists and 
patent law scholars to understand the patent system and its workings. In 
this article, we attempt to answer some fundamental questions regarding 
the role played by the courts in the patent system by examining a set of 
patent cases in great detail. To this end, we have constructed a new 
database based on court docket reports for all patent cases filed in 1995, 
1997, and 2000, and tracked the evolution of these cases (about 6300 
 
 
 294. The total number of days for rulings of invalidity was 13,566 in 1995, while the total number 
of documents filed was 5,423; the number of rulings of invalidity was twenty-nine.  
 295. The total number of days for rulings of invalidity was 34,973 in 1997, while the total number 
of documents filed was 9,225; the number of rulings of invalidity was forty-one. 
 296. The total number of days for rulings of invalidity was 41,952 in 2000, while the total number 
of documents filed was 10,608; the number of rulings of invalidity was forty-eight. 
 297. Among the 1997 cases, nineteen of the forty-one cases with a ruling of invalidity had a 
duration greater than the median among all cases proceeding to rulings; twenty-one such cases were 
above the median number of filed documents in cases which proceeded to rulings.  
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cases) through to settlement or adjudication on the merits. The focus of 
this effort is on keeping track of a number of variables so that one can 
understand the precise disposition of each case. 
We have also tracked different characteristics in order to estimate 
patent litigation costs in each case. For instance, we note the amount of 
time taken by each case through to final disposition. In addition, we have 
devised a new proxy for measuring costs: the number of documents filed 
by all the parties in each case, which we believe is more closely correlated 
with actual litigation costs than the traditional measures of time expended 
and the stage of termination in each case.  
Our results show that many more patent cases are adjudicated on the 
merits (either at the pre-trial stage through a grant of summary judgment 
or at trial) than is commonly thought. This work is one of the few efforts 
in empirical litigation scholarship that can actually estimate this amount; 
most other papers rely exclusively on the imprecise categorization 
performed by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to determine 
case outcomes. Our results demonstrate that, in addition to the small 
number of patent cases going to trial (about 5%298), another significant 
percentage of cases, about 6%–9%, are resolved on the merits through 
summary judgment.299  
Consequently, summary judgments are important in patent cases for 
determining patent validity and infringement. The summary judgments 
related to patent validity occur earlier in the litigation than summary 
judgments related to patent infringement. This result is somewhat 
encouraging given the important role played by the courts in revoking 
patent rights improvidently granted at the outset by the PTO. Nevertheless, 
despite the fact that such rulings occur “early” in the proceedings 
compared to patent trials, we should still be concerned about the huge 
transaction costs associated with patent litigation because summary 
judgments in general, and summary judgment rulings based on invalidity 
in particular, are expensive.  
In addition, there is a significant difference in duration and number of 
documents filed in cases resolved through summary judgment for the 1997 
filed cases compared with the 1995 filed cases. This is consistent with the 
changes brought about by the Markman decision, which invigorated claim 
construction as a threshold legal issue in patent litigation. The increased 
importance after Markman placed on construing the claims before 
 
 
 298. See supra Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
 299. See supra Tables 4, 5, and 6. 
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addressing infringement or invalidity necessitates that significant 
resources be allotted to the step of claim construction before, or concurrent 
with, filing motions for summary judgment. Hence, it is not surprising that 
in the 1997 filed cases more resources were expended earlier in the 
litigation compared with the 1995 filed cases. 
Overall, our results show that the transaction costs associated with 
patent litigation loom large, and rulings on the merits by the courts 
concerning patent validity, patent infringement, and remedies for 
infringement, i.e., injunctive relief or damages, are rare, expensive, and 
not pursued to completion by most litigants. Instead most patent cases 
settle fairly quickly, i.e., about twelve to fifteen months after the filing of 
the complaint, thereby reducing the actual cost of patent litigation 
considerably.  
This work has significant implications for all civil litigation in general, 
and for recent efforts to reform the patent system by either improving 
patent quality through new administrative procedures at the PTO or by 
substantive patent law reform. Our results strongly suggest that patent 
litigation is largely a settlement mechanism, and hence, any proposed 
change in the patent laws should be analyzed in terms of the incentives 
generated for prompt settlement of patent disputes. In addition, entities 
and interest groups seeking cheaper and/or a greater number of patent 
rulings concerning validity and infringement will be wise to look 
elsewhere, perhaps at other patent institutions, such as the PTO, or at other 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that complement the courts. 
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